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Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple 
Akhil Reed Amar1 
"[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice 
put in jeopardy of life or limb . . . ."1 
Modern Supreme Court case law is full of double jeopardy double talk. 
Consider first the poetic phrase "life or limb." It seems sensible enough to read 
these words as a grim and graphic metaphor for criminal sanctions?and such 
an approach runs deep in American case law, to say nothing of English 
literature. This reading also makes the most sense of the precise location of the 
Fifth Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause, wedged as it is between two other 
provisions?the Grand Jury and Self-Incrimination Clauses?that apply only 
to criminal offenses. But can "life or limb" be stretched to encompass some 
civil suits involving only money? Today's Supreme Court seems to think so,2 
but how can this be squared with the text and structure of the Fifth 
Amendment? The Fifth Amendment Due Process Clause clearly applies to civil 
cases, but isn't its "life, liberty, or property" language obviously 
contradistinguished from the more narrow "life or limb" language of the Fifth 
Amendment Double Jeopardy Clause? 
Consider next a far more egregious example of modern double jeopardy 
double talk. The Double Jeopardy Clause speaks of the "same" offense, and 
yet the Court casually applies the Clause to offenses that are not the same but 
obviously different. Premeditated murder is not the same as attempted murder 
or manslaughter; armed robbery is not the same as robbery; and yet under the 
so-called Blockburger test, the Court generally treats a greater offense as the 
same as each of its logically lesser-included offenses.3 But on rare occasions, 
t Southmayd Professor of Law, Yale Law School. 
1. U.S. Const. amend. V. 
2. See, e.g., United States v. Ursery, 116 S. Ct. 2135, 2142-41 (1996); see also Department of 
Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994); United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989). 
3. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299 (1932). In fact, the Blockburger case itself does not 
quite stand for the global test of sameness that later courts have attributed to it. See infra note 38. For an 
example of a modern-day application of the so-called Blockburger test, see, e.g., Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 
1807 
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the Court rejects this test and reminds us that "[q]uite obviously the [greater] 
offense is not, in any common-sense or literal meaning ofthe term, the 'same' 
offense as one of [its lesser-included] offenses."4 How can we make sense of 
all this? 
Finally, consider the question of precisely when "jeopardy" attaches. The 
modern Court claims that once the jury is sworn, a defendant is in 
"jeopardy."5 Thus, defendant A cannot be tried a second time if, say, her first 
jury is dismissed because of gross prosecutorial misconduct. But if defendant 
B's first jury is dismissed for some other reason?because it cannot reach a 
unanimous verdict or because some jurors fall ill during trial?then B can 
indeed be tried again.6 Why, on the Court's premises, doesn't such a retrial 
likewise place a person twice in jeopardy?and for the identical offense?in 
obvious violation of the bright-line rule of the Clause? And if a person is 
simply not "in jeopardy" until his jury is sworn, does this mean that if 
defendant C has won an acquittal in a fair and suitably error-free trial, C may 
nonetheless be reindicted for the same offense and held in pretrial detention 
until a second jury is sworn? If not?if jeopardy really attaches upon Cs 
second indictment itself?does this mean that when a good faith prosecutor 
dismisses defendant D's first indictment pretrial, then the government is 
forever barred from bringing a new indictment on the same offense against D 
(based, say, on new evidence)? 
Modern Supreme Court case law is also full of double jeopardy double 
takes. For example, in the 1975 Jenkins case,7 the Court, per Justice 
Rehnquist, promulgated a double jeopardy test for identifying which erroneous 
trial court dismissals could be appealed by the government, reversed on appeal, 
and remanded for proper retrial.8 But in the 1978 Scott case,9 the Court, per 
Justice Rehnquist, explicitly overruled the 1975 Jenkins case and promulgated 
a new test.10 (As we shall see, this new test is also flawed11?but never 
mind that for now.) Another example: In the 1990 Corbin case,12 the Court, 
161, 166-69 (1977), which barred prosecution for auto theft on double jeopardy grounds because the 
defendant had been previously convicted of the lesser-included offense of joyriding. 
4. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 786 (1985) (holding that continuing criminal enterprise 
(CCE) offense is not same as any of its lesser-included predicate crimes). 
5. See Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 32-38 (1978). 
6. See, e.g., id. at 34 n.10; Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505-16 (1978); Wade v. Hunter, 
336 U.S. 684, 688-92 (1949). 
7. United States v. Jenkins, 420 U.S. 358 (1975). 
8. See id. at 365-70 (generally barring any government appeal that would require retrial). 
9. United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82 (1978). 
10. See id. at 95-101 (allowing erroneous ruling to be appealed and case retried if ruling was not 
related to factual guilt or innocence). 
11. See infra Part III (defending "continuing jeopardy" approach that would permit appeal of virtually 
all erroneous rulings by trial judge). 
12. Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 
(1993). 
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by a five-to-four vote, laid down a general test for identifying which formally 
different offenses should be treated as the "same" for double jeopardy 
purposes.13 But in the 1993 Dixon case,14 the Court, by a five-to-four vote, 
explicitly overruled the 1990 Corbin case.15 And yet in the 1994 Kurth Ranch 
case,16 the Court, by a five-to-four vote, ignored the 1993 Dixon test without 
explanation, and seemed sub silentio to apply some version of the overruled 
1990 Corbin test.17 As the modern Court itself has noted, "the decisional law 
in [the double jeopardy] area is a veritable Saragasso Sea which could not fail 
to challenge the most intrepid judicial navigator."18 
What, in the end, are we to make of all this double jeopardy double talk, 
of all these double jeopardy double takes? In this Essay, I will suggest that the 
Double Jeopardy Clause is in fact rather simple and easy to apply. "Life or 
limb" connotes all criminal sanctions but never covers a mere civil suit about 
money. "Same offense" means just that?murder means murder, not attempted 
murder. And 
"jeopardy" begins with an indictment and ends with a suitably 
error-free verdict. However, the Double Jeopardy Clause itself does not 
exhaust the scope of constitutional principle involved in multiple prosecution 
and multiple punishment cases. Rather, the clean and simple rules of the 
Double Jeopardy Clause must be supplemented by several broader but more 
flexible commonsense principles protected by the Due Process Clause?and by 
certain other rules and principles rooted in the Sixth Amendment Jury Trial 
Clause. Rhetorically, the Court has tied itself into knots because it has failed 
to carefully disentangle the Double Jeopardy, Due Process, and Jury Trial 
Clauses. As a result, some defendants today are getting windfalls?needless 
and dangerous "get out of jail free" cards?while other defendants are getting 
less than they constitutionally deserve. Lawmakers, lawyers, citizens, and the 
Justices themselves are deprived of a clear account of exactly what the 
Constitution says, where, and why. 
In this Essay, I seek to provide such an account.19 
13. See id. at 521 (holding that in second trial, government may not "prove conduct that constitutes 
an offense for which the defendant has already been prosecuted"). 
14. United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993). 
15. See id. at 703-12 (overruling Corbin and restoring Blockburger as sole test of sameness). 
16. Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch, 114 S. Ct. 1937 (1994). 
17. For more analysis, see infra text accompanying notes 105-35. 
18. Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981). 
19. A roadmap may be helpful here. In Part I, I explore the scope of the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
Does it, for example, ever apply to civil cases? In Part II, I ask when two offenses should be deemed the 
same, and I identify the functional concerns that should animate analysis here. In Part III, I examine when 
jeopardy begins and ends?attaches?with particular emphasis on the issues of continuing jeopardy, 
erroneous jury verdicts, and mistrials. To put the point textually rather than functionally, Part I explores 
the phrase "life or limb"; Part II explains the words "same offense"; and Part III expounds the trope "twice in jeopardy." 
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I. "Life or Limb" 
Before we analyze in detail the precise meaning of the double jeopardy 
rule, let us consider its scope, its domain: What proceedings are covered by the 
rule? A hyperliteralist might insist that the Clause applies only to cases where 
the threatened punishment involves death or dismemberment?"life" or "limb." 
Although Justice Joseph Story once came close to saying as much on circuit 
to wriggle out of a tight spot,20 the Supreme Court rejected this gambit long 
ago in Ex Parte Lange,21 holding that the Clause applies to all criminal 
cases.22 "[A]t the time this [double jeopardy] maxim came into existence," 
explained the Lange Court, "almost every offence was punished with death or 
other punishment touching the person."23 And so the phrase "life or limb" 
should be understood as a vivid and poetic metaphor for all criminal 
punishment. 
"A vivid and poetic metaphor?" our hyperliteralist might sneer. "In the 
Constitution? What about plain meaning?" Yes, I would respond, what about 
it? Surely the nuances of words and phrases are part of their plain meaning. 
The obviously alliterative, monosyllabic coupling of two good Old English 
words in the "life or limb" clause; their tethering to another fine poetic word, 
"jeopardy" (deriving from the French jeu-perdre, a "game" that one might 
"lose," and the Middle English iuparti, an uncertain game);24 and the 
prominence of the unitary phrase "life or limb" in poetic and literary texts 
stretching back at least 500 years before the Bill of Rights25?all this is part 
of the plain meaning of the phrase. The hyperliteralist tries to play divide and 
conquer, splitting one phrase into two parts?"life" or "limb"?but in fact, the 
plain meaning yokes these words together in a single unitary phrase, "life or 
limb," whose whole is greater than its parts. Fidelity to constitutional text 
requires that we pay close heed to what the Constitution is trying to tell us; 
and to miss all the poetic notes here is to be not faithful, but tone-deaf. (Not 
literally tone-deaf, of course, but metaphorically?that's the point.) 
Since words are sometimes used rather literally, and other times more 
metaphorically, faithful textualism must also attend to the apparent purpose and 
20. See United States v. Gibert, 25 F. Cas. 1287, 1294-97 (C.C.D. Mass. 1834) (No. 15,204) (finding 
"life or limb" clause inapplicable to misdemeanors); see also OFFICE OF Legal Policy, U.S. Dep't OF 
Justice, Report to the Attorney General on Double Jeopardy Appeals of acquittals, No. 6 
(1987) [hereinafter OLP REPORT], reprinted in 22 U. MlCH. J.L. REFORM 831, 842 (1989) (presenting 
originalist evidence that "life or limb" was term of art for felonies); cf. id. at 862 n.108 (declining to press 
this point in light of well-established case law reading phrase more broadly to encompass misdemeanors 
too). 
21. 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163(1873). 
22. See id. at 170-73. 
23. Id. at 173. 
24. See 8 The Oxford English Dictionary 214 (2d ed. 1989). 
25. See id. at 956 (quoting source from 1205 using phrases "lif & leomen" and "leome & vppe lif'; 
source from 1300 using phrase "leme or lif; source from 1362 using phrase "his lyf and his leome"; source 
from 1480 using phrase "lyf and lymme"; and source from 1548 using phrase "lifes and lymmes"). 
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logic of a given clause. To me at least, it is hard to see why the double 
jeopardy principle should apply when the state wants to chop off my toes, but 
not when it seeks to slit my nose, or brand my skin, or gouge my ears, or flay 
my back. (All these, of course, were actual punishments meted out in 
seventeenth-century England.)26 These are punishments that, to borrow from 
Lange, quite literally "touch[] the person";27 and these are "games" that the 
government should not be able to keep playing until it wins. Imprisonment 
may not literally deprive me of my limbs, but chains and bars do deprive me 
of free use of my limbs?and so here too it seems that the spirit and purpose 
of the Clause obviously apply. 
Nor is any of this mere special pleading on behalf of a pet clause. 
Consider, for example, the outlandish results that hyperliteralism would seem 
to demand elsewhere in the Constitution. Shall we say that because Article I 
addresses only "land and naval Forces"?"Armies" and "a Navy"28?that the 
Air Force is unconstitutional? Or that photographs can never receive copyright 
protection because the Copyright Clause speaks only of "Authors" and 
"Writings"?29 Or that a handwritten private letter lacks all First Amendment 
protection because it is neither an oral "speech" nor the product of a printing 
"press"?30 Or that a defendant may not subpoena and introduce reliable 
physical evidence that proves his innocence because the Sixth Amendment 
gives him only a right to compel the production of "witnesses" in his favor?31 
But once we go beyond literal lives and limbs, where shall we stop? Were 
the Double Jeopardy Clause freestanding, I would think its life or limb 
imagery should obviously apply to imprisonment and all serious criminal 
punishments and should probably apply to petty criminal punishments 
(including criminal fines which, by their inherently stigmatic nature as 
"criminal" sanctions, rob a man of his good name as well as his purse by 
branding him a "criminal"),32 but should never apply to mere civil suits 
involving only money. (It is, after all, precisely the obvious contrast between 
"life or limb," on the one hand, and mere "money," on the other, that drives 
the drama of Shakespeare's great meditation on law, lawyers, and 
hyperliteralism, The Merchant of Venice.)33 
26. See, e.g., 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *376-77. 
27. See supra text accompanying note 23. 
28. U.S. CONST. art. I, ? 8, cls. 12-14. 
29. Id. cl. 8. 
30. Id. amend. I. For an earlier exploration of this analogy, see Akhil Reed Amar, The Case of the 
Missing Amendments: R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 106 HARV. L. REV. 124, 134 & n.66 (1992). 
31. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI. For more discussion and analysis of this point, see Akhil Reed Amar, 
Foreword: Sixth Amendment First Principles, 84 GEO. L.J. 641, 647-49 (1996). 
32. Cf. William Shakespeare, Othello, act 3, sc. 3 ("Who steals my purse steals trash_But 
he that filches from me my good name/Robs me of that which not enriches him/And makes me poor 
indeed."). Note the metaphoric link here to physical branding. See supra text accompanying note 26. 
33. For a brilliant meditation on these (and other) themes of the play, see Kenji Yoshino, The Lawyer 
ofBelmont, 9 Yale J.L. & HUMAN. (forthcoming Summer 1997). 
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Happily, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not stand alone, but rather 
shoulder to shoulder with other clauses of the Fifth Amendment. Faithful 
textualism attends to the context as well as the text of a clause, and here 
context confirms our freestanding textual analysis. A faithful reader hearkening 
to nuance should not fail to note the obvious contrast between "life or limb" 
in the Double Jeopardy Clause and the more sweeping "life, liberty, or 
property" phrasing of the Due Process Clause, which clearly applies to a mere 
civil suit about only money. More generally, we should note the grand are of 
ever-greater inclusion, the subtle spiraling outward of clausal scope, in the 
sequence of Fifth Amendment clauses. First comes the Grand Jury Clause, 
limited to 
"capital and otherwise infamous crime"; next comes the broader 
poetry of "life or limb"; then comes the perhaps broader?or at least 
clearer?scope of the Self-Incrimination Clause, applicable in "any criminal 
case"; and finally comes the still broader Due Process Clause encompassing 
all civil and criminal proceedings implicating "life, liberty, or property." 
Of course, to say that the Double Jeopardy Clause does not reach civil 
cases about money34 is not to leave defendants in these cases defenseless 
against state assault. Rather, it is to give them the shield of the Due Process 
Clause. Even if the Double Jeopardy Clause, strictly speaking, does not apply, 
if its rules make sense where they do apply, analogous rules could be 
assimilated into more general due process protection.35 And the root 
commonsense idea underlying double jeopardy is generalizable beyond 
criminal cases: Government should not structure the adjudication game so that 
it is "heads we win; tails let's play again until you lose; then let's quit (unless 
we want to play again)." 
The problem, alas, is that in its domain, the Double Jeopardy Clause has 
been read far beyond this commonsense norm; and so long as this is so, the 
damage should and can, in a principled way, be cabined to criminal cases. But 
a better approach would be to solve the problems at their root in double 
jeopardy doctrine proper. First, conviction of a lesser-included offense should 
not always bar a second prosecution for a greater offense. Second, an 
erroneous acquittal should not be immune from correction on appeal followed 
by a fair retrial. To see this more clearly, we must turn to the two other 
intriguing phrases in the Double Jeopardy Clause, "same offence" and "twice 
in jeopardy." Let us start with the words "same offense." 
34. To be sure, a genuine criminal punishment masquerading as a "civil" sanction can and should be 
unmasked by courts; but this unmasking would summon up all the Constitution's criminal procedure 
protections, not merely the Double Jeopardy Clause. See infra text accompanying note 128. 
It is also worth noting that not until the late 1980s did the Supreme Court ever embrace the novel 
notion that the Double Jeopardy Clause could be stretched to cover some civil suits about money. See 
United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989). For an analysis of how a Due Process Clause analysis would 
have better fit the facts of Halper, see infra text accompanying notes 130-35. 
35. See infra text accompanying notes 130-43. 
1997] Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple 1813 
II. "Same Offense" 
In contrast to the metaphoric and somewhat fuzzy phrase "life or limb," 
the phrase "same offense" feels exact, precise, mathematical. If X is the same 
as Y, and Y is the same as Z, then X is the same as Z by the clear and hard 
logic of transitivity. Rose is a rose is a rose.36 Same means same; and done 
is done?this is the obvious meaning of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Thus, 
after a defendant has been tried and "finally" "acquitted" or "convicted" of 
attempted murder in a "fair" and "suitably error-free" trial?and we shall later 
refine the concepts in quotes37?he cannot be retried for the same attempted 
murder. 
But can he later be tried for premeditated murder? The Supreme Court has 
put forth a test that, applied with a straight face, would always bar this second 
trial. Under the so-called Blockburger test, attempted murder is the same as 
premeditated murder.38 More generally, a greater offense, under Blockburger, 
is treated as the same as any logically lesser-included offense with some but 
not all of the formal "elements" of the greater offense?in other words, 
Blockburger treats two offenses as different if and only if each requires an 
element the other does not.39 Sometimes, Blockburger's rule makes sense: As 
we shall see, if a defendant were acquitted in a fair attempted murder trial, 
there would be something wrong and unconstitutional about retrying him for 
the "different" offense of murder.40 But other times, Blockburger's rule makes 
far less sense: Suppose a defendant is convicted in a fair attempted murder 
trial, and the victim thereafter dies from injuries proximately caused by the 
initial attack. Taken seriously, Blockburger's rule would bar a murder trial here 
too?even if the state stood ready to offset against the murder sentence any 
penalty already imposed for the attempt (so as to avoid any kind of double- 
counting). But as early as 1912, the Supreme Court held in the Diaz case41 
that a Blockburger-like test should not be taken seriously in this scenario, and 
that a second trial should not be barred.42 Moreover, in the 1985 Garrett 
case,43 the Court applied Diaz-like logic to uphold a trial for a greater 
continuing criminal enterprise offense after the defendant had already been 
36. Cf. Gertrude Stein, Sacred Emily (1913). 
37. See infra Part III. 
38. See Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932). On its facts, Blockburger propounded 
a test for identifying when two offenses could be charged in a single proceeding, resulting in two 
convictions and possibly cumulative sentences. This test thus addressed what I shall later call the "double- 
counting" problem. See infra Subsection II.B.1. Later courts, however, applied Blockburger's test as a 
general measure of double jeopardy sameness for situations involving successive prosecutions. See, e.g., 
Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 168 (1977) (noting that greater and lesser-included offenses are "by 
definition the 'same'" for double jeopardy purposes). 
39. See Blockburger, 284 U.S. at 304. 
40. See infra Subsections II.B.3^ (discussing implicit acquittals and collateral estoppel). 
41. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912). 
42. See id. at 448-49. This case is discussed infra text accompanying note 76. 
43. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985). 
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convicted of a lesser-included predicate offense.44 But other Supreme Court 
cases?the 1977 Brown v. Ohio case,45 for example?have blandly ignored 
the deep logic of Diaz and have instead idolized Blockburger. 
All this is, to put it mildly, confusing. If greater and lesser-included 
offenses really are the "same" offense within the meaning of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause, by what right do judges carve out Diaz/Garrett exceptions 
to clear textual commands? And if the answer is that of the Diaz and Garrett 
Courts?that quite obviously a greater offense is not in any commonsense or 
literal way the same offense as one of its lesser-included offenses46?then by 
what right do judges continue to apply Blockburger? If Diaz and Garrett are 
right, then isn't Brown wrong?at least in reasoning and perhaps also in result? 
Now move beyond these legal puzzles to logical puzzles. As we have seen, 
transitivity is a basic property of sameness: If one thing is the same as each 
of two other things, each of those things must be the same as the other. But 
the Blockburger rule of sameness flunks this elementary test. Under 
Blockburger, murder is the "same" as the lesser-included offense of 
involuntary manslaughter, and is also the "same" as the lesser-included crime 
of attempted murder, but these two lesser offenses are not the same as each 
other. (Only one requires a dead body; only the other requires an intent to kill.) 
Under Blockburger, the lesser-included offense of robbery is the "same" as the 
greater offenses of armed robbery and bank robbery, but these greater offenses 
are not the same. (One requires a gun, the other a bank.) 
Blockburger, it seems, is a mess, legally and logically. Can we do better 
than this? I think so. 
A. Same Means Same (and Offense Means Offense) 
When we consider the entire text of the Double Jeopardy Clause, and its 
history, a same-means-same approach makes perfect sense. At common law, 
the double jeopardy idea encompassed two basic pleas in bar, prior acquittal 
and prior conviction?in law French, autrefois acquit de meme felonie and 
autrefois convict de meme felonie.41 The obvious idea here is that if a person 
has, on a prior occasion (autrefois) been acquitted or convicted of the exact 
same crime (la meme felonie) with which he is now charged, he can plead the 
previous judgment as a bar to the second indictment. 
44. See id. This case is discussed infra text accompanying notes 82-87. 
45. 432 U.S. 161 (1977). This case is discussed infra text accompanying notes 78-81. 
46. See Garrett, 471 U.S. at 786; Diaz, 223 U.S. at 448-49. 
47. See 4 Blackstone, supra note 26, at *335-36; 2 MATTHEW Hale, The HiSTORY OF THE Pleas 
of the Crown *240-55; 2 William Hawkins, A Treatise of the Pleas of the Crown 368-79 
(Garland Publ'g, Inc. 1978) (1721). At common law, a third plea, autrefois attaint complemented autrefois 
acquit and autrefois convict. Courts have also linked double jeopardy to the plea of prior pardon. See 
United States v. Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 87 (1978); United States v. Wilson, 420 U.S. 332, 340 (1975). 
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The logic behind this rule is simple. If Atticus has already been convicted 
of, say, attempted murder, in a fair trial that has rendered a final judgment, it 
is not right to try to heap a second punishment upon him in a second trial for 
what was after all only a single legal offense. A second punishment is a kind 
of double-counting, in which courts might end up imposing more punishment 
than the legislature authorized, in obvious violation of basic principles of the 
rule of law. If Atticus received the maximum sentence allowable at his first 
trial?say, ten years?then to subject him to a risk of another ten years is 
obviously wrong and unlawful. And, if this second trial were allowed, when 
would things stop? If two trials and two ten-year sentences are okay, why not 
three, or four, or . . . ? Anyone guilty of anything could end up being infinitely 
punished in defiance of statutes prescribing maximum penalties. 
Here we see how the Double Jeopardy Clause, via the constitutionally 
guaranteed plea of autrefois convict, protects even the guilty. But the Clause 
is more precious for its protection of the innocent, via the constitutionally 
grounded plea of autrefois acquit. If Amanda is acquitted in a fair and error- 
free trial for attempted murder, the state may not ignore this final judgment 
and force her into a second trial for the same attempted murder. One obvious 
reason here is to protect the innocent from erroneous conviction.48 If two 
trials are okay, why not three, or four, or . . . ? Eventually, the state may be 
able to wear an innocent Amanda down, and find one statistically aberrant or 
quirky jury that would erroneously convict.49 Even if the state fails to convict 
Amanda in later trials, these judicial ordeals themselves can impose crushing 
psychic and financial costs on an innocent defendant.50 Basic notions of 
symmetry are also offended by this "heads-we-win, tails-let's-play-again" 
scheme. If the state wins in an initial fair trial for attempted murder, it does 
not give the defendant the right to ignore the verdict and demand a new trial 
on a clean slate. Why should the defendant be placed in a lesser position when 
she wins? When the game is over, it's over. The winner is the winner; that's 
that; done is done. 
And "same offense" is "same offense."51 Even if a murder and robbery 
spring from the same crime spree, or the same underlying factual "transaction," 
they remain different legal offenses in statute books and decisional law?with 
48. Elsewhere, I have suggested that the protection of the innocent from erroneous conviction is one 
of the root principles of our system of constitutional criminal procedure. See, e.g., Amar, supra note 31, 
at 642-46; Akhil Reed Amar, The Future of Constitutional Criminal Procedure, 33 AM. CRIM. L. Rev. 
1123 (1996). See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION A D CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FlRST 
Principles (1997). 
49. Thus, there is a resonance between the autrefois acquit idea and the Winship principle that seeks 
to avoid erroneous convictions by placing a heavy burden of proof on the government. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358 (1970). 
50. See Amar, supra note 31, at 658-62. 
51. Cf. George Kannar, The Constitutional Catechism of Antonin Scalia, 99 YALE LJ. 1297, 1323 
n.128, 1324, 1337 (1990) (tracing similar tropes in writings of Justice Scalia). 
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different formal legal elements. They are not la meme felonie.52 And so the 
Double Jeopardy Clause does not, for example, give Robert the right to plead 
autrefois convict to a first-degree murder charge merely because he has already 
been convicted of a robbery that grew out of the same set of events. Indeed, 
at the time of the Founding, the murder and the robbery would ordinarily not 
have been tried together.53 Today, joinder rules might allow the two offenses 
to be litigated in a single trial, but the Double Jeopardy Clause does not 
demand that they be so tried. 
As we shall see, general due process principles can be construed to require 
that factually related crimes be tried together, but this command cannot easily 
be crammed into the Double Jeopardy Clause in light of the syntax, grammar, 
purpose, and history of the Clause.54 The Clause lays down a clear bright-line 
rule enforced by a special plea in bar before the second trial has even begun. 
And this enforcement scheme works perfectly where "same offense" means 
same legally defined offense; but not where "same offense" means factually 
related action or same overall transaction. Sometimes, the witnesses and 
evidence needed to prove one crime will materialize before the witnesses and 
evidence materialize for a factually related but legally distinct offense. But the 
precise amount of evidentiary overlap and divergence between "related" crimes 
will be highly case- and fact-specific and will often not be apparent before 
trial.55 The Due Process Clause can flexibly accommodate all these concerns, 
and can be invoked during or after the second trial, when it becomes clear in 
retrospect that the second trial could easily have been folded into the first.56 
But the Double Jeopardy Clause is designed to spare Atticus and Amanda from 
the burden of the second trial itself: The second trial itself impermissibly 
"put[s]" the defendant "twice in jeopardy" in violation ofthe plain meaning of 
the Clause.57 And so the language of the Clause is limited to the "same 
52. See, e.g., 4 BLACKSTONE, supra note 26, at *336 ("It is to be observed that the pleas of autrefois 
acquit and autrefois convict . . . must be upon a prosecution for the same identical act and crime") 
(emphasis altered); 2 Hale, supra note 47, at *245-46 (stating that burglary and larceny committed "at the 
same time" are different offenses; prior acquittal of one will not bar prosecution of other); 2 HAWKINS, 
supra note 47, at 371 ("It seems that it is no Plea to an Appeal of Larceny, That the Defendant hath been 
found Not guilty in an Action of Trespass brought against him by the same Plaintiff for the same Goods; 
for Larceny and Trespass are entirely different."); id. at 376 (offering similar example). The foregoing 
sources, and many others, are discussed in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 530-35 (1990) (Scalia, J., 
dissenting). That discussion, in turn, was heavily relied on in United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 709-10 
(1993). 
53. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring) ("English common 
law . . . severely restricted the power of prosecutors to combine several charges in a single trial."); 1 James 
Fitzjames Stephen, A History of the Criminal Law of England 508 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 
1980) (1883) ("In an indictment for felony one offence only can practically be charged."). 
54. But see Ashe, 397 U.S. at 453-54 (Brennan, J., concurring) (arguing that Double Jeopardy Clause 
generally requires that all offenses arising out of "same transaction" be prosecuted in single proceeding). 
55. See Corbin, 495 U.S. at 529-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
56. Cf. United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 858-59 (1978) (making similar point about Speedy 
Trial Clause). 
57. See Corbin, 495 U.S. at 529-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 
660-62 (1977). 
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offense"; its grammar is absolute, not flexible and case-specific; its purpose is 
to prevent the second trial entirely; and its history shows it to be a 
paradigmatically pretrial plea. 
As Robert's murder/robbery hypothetical illustrates, two offenses cannot 
be the same if they have different legal elements. But under the Double 
Jeopardy Clause, an offense must not only be the same in law?it must also 
be the same in fact. Even if Robert is convicted of robbery in an earlier trial, 
he may later be charged with and tried for robbery so long as the second 
indictment concerns a factually different robbery?committed, say, on a 
different day against a different victim. (Of course, to the extent that the two 
robberies grew out of the same factual "transaction" with a high degree of 
evidentiary overlap and a small amount of evidentiary divergence, the Due 
Process Clause could, as noted, be construed as a constitutionally based 
mandatory joinder principle.)58 Even if the identity of the robbery victim and 
the day of the robbery are not formal elements of the offense of robbery?in 
other words, even if the legal elements in Robert's two trials are 
identical?Robert would have no good double jeopardy defense. He simply 
broke the same law twice, and thus he may be tried twice and punished twice. 
He may be "twice put in jeopardy of life or limb" because he committed two 
offenses, not one. 
At times, nice "unit of prosecution" questions will arise.59 Are two pulls 
of the trigger one attempted murder or two? (Does it matter if the two pulls 
are aimed at two different persons; or aimed at the same person, but on 
different days, as parts of different schemes?) Is an ongoing course of 
continuous conduct one offense or several? Is marrying four women one 
bigamy or three? (Does it matter whether the marriages occur simultaneously 
or sequentially?) Is a liquor store stickup in which the robber takes money 
from two persons one armed robbery or two? (Does it matter whether the two 
are both clerks, or are instead one clerk and one store patron?) These questions 
are both fascinating and difficult, but they are ultimately questions of 
substantive law, questions on which the Double Jeopardy Clause is wholly 
agnostic. The Clause takes substantive criminal law as it finds it; it is 
outlandish (and judicially unworkable) to suppose that hidden deep in the word 
"offense" lies some magic metatheory of substantive criminal law, telling 
legislators in all times and places what can and cannot be made criminal. And 
58. I place the word "transaction" in quotes because this word is hardly self-defining, as even the chief 
proponent of a "same transaction" rule has acknowledged. See Ashe, 397 U.S. at 454 n.8 (Brennan, J., 
concurring). 
In light of the incentive effects created by other (relatively easily enforced) constitutional 
rules?namely, the asymmetric rule of collateral estoppel?a global mandatory joinder rule for offenses 
growing out of the same "transaction" is probably unnecessary and unwise as a matter of due process 
(though textually permissible). For more explanation, see infra text accompanying notes 102, 130-32. 
59. For an excellent discussion, see Peter Westen & Richard Drubel, Toward a General Theory of 
Double Jeopardy, 1978 SUP. CT. REV. 81, 111-22. 
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so it is up to the legislature to decide whether planting and exploding a bomb 
should be one crime or two (because the bomb was first planted, then 
exploded) or fifty (because fifty people died) or 500 (because 450 more were 
at risk) or 1,000,500 (because the bomb also destroyed one million dollars of 
property and each dollar of bomb damage is defined as a separate offense).60 
The Eighth Amendment's Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause might impose 
limits on the total amount of punishment that can be heaped upon a person for 
a single "act" or series of acts,61 but the Double Jeopardy Clause imposes no 
limits on how the legislature may carve up conduct into discrete legal offense 
units.62 
B. Rethinking Blockburger's Boxes 
In light of all this, it seems obvious that a same-offense-means-same- 
offense approach to the Double Jeopardy Clause enjoys clear textual, historical, 
and logical advantages over the Blockburger test. It remains to see how a 
plain-meaning approach to the Double Jeopardy Clause, when properly 
supplemented by various due process rules and principles, is functionally 
superior to Blockburger. As we shall see, Blockburger's test makes sense 
insofar as it (1) prevents double-counting; (2) requires joinder of certain related 
charges to prohibit vexatious reprosecution; (3) affirms the concept of implicit 
acquittal; and (4) safeguards the defendant's right to collateral estoppel. But 
Blockburger achieves these functional results in a crude and imprecise manner 
that is both over- and underinclusive. A more functional approach would admit 
that same means same (and offense means offense) in the Double Jeopardy 
Clause, and would use the Due Process Clause directly to vindicate these four 
principles in cases where the Double Jeopardy Clause alone cannot bear the 
textual load. Such a direct approach would avoid Blockburger s overprotective 
rigidity in cases where its test makes no sense?Diaz,63 Brown,64 and 
Garrett65?and would also avoid Blockburger^ underprotective narrowness 
60. See id. at 114 ("There is simply no way to make sense out of the notion that a course of conduct 
is 'really' only one act, rather than two or three, or, indeed, as many as one likes."); Comment, Twice in 
Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 275-77 (1965) (making similar point). 
61. See Nancy J. King, Portioning Punishment: Constitutional Limits on Successive and Excessive 
Penalties, 144 U. Pa. L. Rev. 101 (1995); Westen & Drubel, supra note 59, at 114.1 place the word "act" 
in quotes here because, like "transaction," act" is hardly self-defining. Cf. supra note 60; see also supra 
note 58. By contrast, an "offense" on my view connotes a precise and discrete set of elements and penalties 
defined by statute or decisional law; and so the word is much easier to define and apply. Cf. King, supra, 
at 182 (arguing that Eighth Amendment prohibits excessive overall punishment for single act, and noting 
that "[t]he concept of punishment under the Eighth Amendment, unlike the textual reference to 'offence' 
in the Fifth Amendment, is not limited by statutory elements or legislative intent"). 
62. See generally Westen & Drubel, supra note 59, at 111-22; see also cases cited infra note 67. 
63. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442 (1912). 
64. Brown v. Ohio, 432 U.S. 161 (1977). 
65. Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773 (1985). Diaz, Brown, and Garrett are discussed infra 
Subsection II.B.2. 
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in cases that fail to pass the Blockburger test for sameness but that 
nevertheless implicate one or more of the four principles. To see this more 
clearly, let us analyze the four logical categories?boxes?where Blockburger 
goes beyond true sameness: (1) prior conviction of a greater offense; (2) prior 
conviction of a lesser-included offense; (3) prior acquittal of a greater offense; 
(4) and prior acquittal of a lesser-included offense.66 
1. Blockburger Box One: The Anti-Double-Counting Principle 
Consider first a case where Robin has been convicted of armed robbery 
and is now charged, in a second prosecution, with robbery for the same 
transaction. Suppose that armed robbery carries an eight-year sentence and 
robbery a five-year sentence. To try Robin in two trials, and impose the 
maximum sentence each time, is to risk a kind of double-counting. Ordinarily, 
it is sensible to presume that the initial armed robbery statutory sentence 
already included five years for the logically lesser-included robbery, and then 
tacked on an additional three years for the use of a gun. And so to convict 
Robin of armed robbery and robbery and to cumulate the maximum sentences 
is in effect to double-count the robbery: (robbery plus gun) plus robbery?(five 
plus three) plus five. By preventing the robbery trial after the armed robbery 
conviction, Blockburger's rule prevents this double-counting. 
But Blockburger^ rule does not achieve this result very directly or 
precisely. For starters, the Supreme Court has now made clear that 
Blockburger^ rule is overbroad to the extent that it irrebuttably bars 
cumulative punishment for logically related but distinct offenses such as 
robbery and armed robbery. In this doctrinal context, at least, Blockburger is 
now seen as simply a rule of construction creating a rebuttable presumption of 
sameness.67 A legislature could, if it wanted (and spoke clearly), define armed 
robbery as a three-year crime to be added to a five-year robbery conviction 
rather than as an eight-year crime to be punished instead of a five-year 
robbery. But once we admit that Blockburger is only a presumption here, it is 
hard to insist that it furnishes a true constitutional definition of sameness. 
Blockburger also underprotects the anti-double-counting principle in a 
number of ways. If Blockburger is indeed simply a Double Jeopardy Clause 
test, it applies only where a prior conviction or acquittal exists. But suppose 
a state prosecutes Robin in a single trial for five-year robbery and eight-year 
armed robbery, and announces its intention to cumulate maximum sentences. 
66. In 1995, Jon Marcus and I sketched out a preliminary critique of Blockburger that set the stage 
for the more thoroughgoing critique I shall now offer. See Akhil Reed Amar & Jonathan L. Marcus, Double 
Jeopardy Law After Rodney King, 95 COLUM. L. Rev. 1, 28-38 (1995). Consider the present Essay, if you 
will, my own double take on double jeopardy. 
67. See Garrett, 471 U.S. at 778-79; Ohio v. Johnson, 467 U.S. 493, 499 n.8 (1984); Missouri v. 
Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 366-67 (1983). 
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This too should be (presumptively) unconstitutional as a (presumptive) double- 
counting of Robin's robbery. It is as if the state simply tried Robin for robbery 
in one trial, and announced in advance it would double the statutory robbery 
punishment. This is indeed a kind of "double jeopardy"?like the "double 
jeopardy" round of the TV game show, when all dollar values are 
doubled?but one that requires some mild but real straining of words to fit into 
the Twice in Jeopardy Clause. Robin is being placed in a kind of "doubled" 
jeopardy, a kind of "two-fold" jeopardy; but is she really being placed twice 
in jeopardy?on two occasions, deuxfoisl At common law could she plead a 
prior (autrefois) conviction? Of course the claim here is not that doubled 
punishment in a single trial is constitutional, or even legal?of course not?but 
that the Double Jeopardy Clause fails to fit snugly here. 
Even if we crammed this hypothetical into the text of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause, other double-counting scenarios cannot be so crammed, under 
Blockburger. Suppose Roberta is charged in a single trial with eight-year 
armed robbery and nine-year bank robbery for a single act in which she robbed 
a bank with a gun. Under the Blockburger test, armed robbery is not the same 
as bank robbery?and so the maximum penalties can be cumulated under 
Blockburger. But this cumulation ends up double-counting the common- 
predicate robbery: (robbery plus gun) plus (robbery plus bank)?(five plus 
three) plus (five plus four). Notwithstanding Blockburger, this double-counting 
should be treated as presumptively violative of due process. If Blockburger 
would (presumptively) prohibit double-counting the robbery in a robbery-plus- 
armed-robbery trial, or in a robbery-plus-bank-robbery trial, surely the true 
logic at work here should (presumptively) bar the similar double-counting of 
the robbery in an armed-robbery-plus-bank-robbery trial. 
Of course, here too, courts should apply this test only as a presumptive 
guide to legislative intent. Perhaps a legislature thinks that an armed bank 
robbery as a whole is worse than the sum of its parts. But if so, it should say 
so clearly in statute books?for example, by creating an offense of armed bank 
robbery explicitly punishable by more than twelve years (five for the robbery, 
three for the gun, four for the bank). If the legislature does not do so, courts 
should, as a simple matter of due process, presumptively deduct five years 
from the cumulative sentences for armed robbery and bank robbery, whether 
those sentences are imposed in a single trial or in two successive 
prosecutions.68 
Alas, in many cases the presumptive math will not be so easy. When two 
offenses overlap, and the overlapping area is not itself a distinct crime with an 
identifiable sentence, a court might have to improvise to avoid double-counting 
the overlapping predicate area. (Sentencing guidelines may be a great boon 
here, since they may assign a specific number to the overlapping element, even 
68. See King, supra note 61, at 194 n.269. 
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if it is not itself a stand-alone crime.) And when more than two offenses are 
involved, the (presumptive) math can get quite tricky indeed.69 Perhaps, in 
some cases, concerns about justiciability and the need for clear lines will result 
in some underenforcement of the anti-double-counting principle?as was 
evident in the famous case of Gore v. United States,10 where various 
overlapping statutes (none logically greater or lesser-included than another) 
were brought to bear on a single transaction. But however courts ultimately 
address the double-counting problem, at least they should be asking the right 
due process question?would cumulative punishment risk double-counting, and 
if so, how much?71?rather than the mismatched, over- and underinclusive 
Blockburger double jeopardy question: Does each crime contain at least one 
element the other lacks? 
2. Blockburger Box Two: The Anti-Vexation Principle 
Consider next the case where a defendant seeks to plead a prior conviction 
of a logically lesser-included crime as a bar to prosecution on a greater 
offense. Here, too, Blockburger tells courts to bar the second prosecution, and 
in so doing both over- and underprotects the true constitutional principles at 
stake. 
Suppose Robin is first prosecuted and convicted for a five-year robbery, 
and then the state seeks to prosecute her for eight-year armed robbery. Of 
course, if the state sought to cumulate punishment, the issue would be the 
same as Blockburger Box One: five plus eight is no different, or 
constitutionally less offensive, than eight plus five. But suppose the state 
stands ready to offset the five-year robbery sentence against the eight-year 
armed robbery sentence; suppose, in other words, that the state in the second 
trial is merely seeking an incremental three-year punishment for the use of the 
gun. 
Blockburger purports to ban this second trial. Sometimes this ban makes 
sense; sometimes it does not. In many cases, the state may have no particularly 
69. Imagine, for example, three crimes, A+B, A+C, and B+C. The first crime (A+B) is punishable by 
five years, the second (A+C) is also punishable by five years, and the third (B+C) is punishable by four 
years. Presumably, the legislature here deems A alone worthy of three years; B worthy of two; and C 
worthy of two. But exactly what is a judge to do if she finds two more crimes on the statute books, A+D, 
and B+D, punishable by four years apiece? The simple presumptive (additive) math breaks down. 
70. 357 U.S. 386 (1958) (upholding six convictions and three consecutive sentences arising out of two 
narcotics sales, in violation of three statutes; first statute banned drug sale without "a written order," second 
banned drug sale without "stamped package," and third banned sale of illegally imported drug). The case 
is discussed in Comment, supra note 60, at 303-04. 
71. Suppose two statutes share a common substantive legal element, but the element is described in 
slightly different language in the two statutes. (Say, one uses the word "intentionally" and the other, 
"purposefully.") The anti-double-counting principle turns on things, not words, and so two verbal formulas 
describing the same thing should (presumptively) be treated as defining the same legal element. Cf. Amar 
& Marcus, supra note 66, at 38^14 (putting forth similar argument for double jeopardy analysis in dual 
sovereignty context). 
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good reason for splitting a single criminal transaction or episode into two 
separate trials. And in some cases, perhaps the state may have particularly 
bad?illegitimate?reasons. Perhaps bifurcation reflects a systematic attempt 
to vex or harass a defendant, by wearing her down in successive proceedings, 
draining her financial resources, and forcing her witnesses to appear twice on 
her behalf. Such vexation can create a real risk that a defendant, though 
innocent of the greater offense, will be erroneously convicted in the second 
trial.72 Or perhaps the prosecutor is trying to evade statutory limits on 
prosecutorial discovery by forcing a defendant to tip her hand in the first 
trial?a preliminary round?so that the state, with the benefit of this "cheat 
peek," has an edge in the second trial, the main event.73 Or perhaps the 
prosecutor is angry and vindictive after the first trial because, although the 
state won a conviction, the defendant largely prevailed in the sentencing, and 
the prosecutor seeks to punish this success?and send a message to future 
defendants?via a new round of charges.74 
But once we see that these are the relevant constitutional principles at 
stake in Blockburger Box Two, it is clear that the rigid Blockburger test itself 
ill fits these principles. To the extent that Blockburger seeks to prevent Robin's 
harassment by, in effect, mandating joinder of robbery and armed robbery, it 
seems odd that Roberta's case (involving armed robbery and bank robbery 
growing out of the same factual transaction) and Robert's case (involving 
robbery and intentional murder arising out of the same factual transaction) are 
treated categorically differently. Why is Blockburger'^ mandatory joinder rule 
limited to greater and lesser-included offenses?75 If the issue is the possible 
72. As we shall see, other constitutional principles that are?or at least should be?in place can 
severely constrain the prosecutor's incentive to strategically bifurcate her prosecution. See infra text 
accompanying notes 102, 130-32. 
73. A similar "peek," of course, can lawfully occur when a defendant is tried, convicted, and 
then?because of impermissible progovernment error?the conviction is set aside and the defendant is 
retried. See infra Part III. 
One obvious way to reduce the prosecutor's incentive to bifurcate litigation and thus evade statutory 
limits on discovery is to allow liberal discovery against the defendant in the first place. Renee Lettow and 
I have elsewhere explained why the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause, rightly understood, poses 
a much smaller obstacle to pretrial discovery against defendants than is conventionally assumed. See Akhil 
Reed Amar & Renee B. Lettow, Fifth Amendment First Principles: The Self-Incrimination Clause, 93 
MlCH. L. REV. 857 (1995) (arguing that defendant can be forced to tell all pretrial, with only narrow 
"testimonial immunity" granted, enabling prosecutor to use all testimonial fruit, but not defendant's words 
themselves, at trial). Here we see a way in which overprotecting some defendants' rights?in this case 
rights to resist discovery?may end up hurting defendants in other ways. 
74. Cf. United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372, 384 (1982) (affirming that due process prohibits 
prosecutors from bringing new vindictive charges to penalize defendant for exercising right to jury trial on 
initial charge, but declining to presume vindictiveness without specific proof); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 
U.S. 21 (1974) (applying due process principles to constrain prosecutorial vindictiveness after successful 
defendant appeal); North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S. 711 (1969) (developing due process test to protect 
against judicial vindictiveness when judge "loses" to defendant who successfully appeals judge's verdict). 
75. See Westen & Drubel, supra note 59, at 162-63 (noting how Blockburger test establishes narrow 
mandatory joinder rule). 
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vexation and harassment and vindictiveness of bifurcated proceedings, why is 
Robin's case so different from Roberta's and Robert's? 
One possible answer is that in Roberta's (bank robbery/armed robbery) 
case and Robert's (robbery/murder) case, the state may have good 
nonvexatious reasons for bifurcation. Perhaps the first-degree murder Robert 
committed did not occur at the precise moment of the robbery; and the two 
crimes involve different groups of witnesses. Perhaps it is clear that Roberta 
robbed a bank, but less clear that she actually used a gun, and the key 
witnesses and evidence about the gun are not available at the same time as the 
bank evidence. Because of this, whatever constitutional mandatory joinder rules 
are applicable in Roberta's and Robert's case must be flexible, fact- and case- 
specific rules of due process, rather than global, rigid, bright-line rules of 
double jeopardy. 
But the same thing is true of Robin's (robbery/armed robbery) case! (And 
here we see how Blockburger, taken seriously, not only underprotects Roberta 
and Robert, but also overprotects Robin.) Despite due diligence, the 
government may not be able to prove?or even know?at the time of Robin's 
robbery trial that she used a gun. Suppose, for example, the armed robbery 
statute requires that the "gun" not be a toy gun, and at the first trial, the state 
lacks good evidence of a real gun. 
Indeed, at the time of the first trial on a lesser-included offense, the greater 
offense may not even have occurred. Recall, for example, the attempted 
murder trial where the victim dies after the trial: Is the state forever barred 
from prosecuting the premeditated murder (with a sentencing offset to avoid 
double-counting)? The Blockburger test says yes; but the Supreme Court now 
says no. As early as 1912, in a case arising in the Philippines and decided 
under a statutory double jeopardy clause, the Diaz Court held as follows: 
The provision against double jeopardy, in the Philippine Civil 
Government Act, is in terms restricted to instances where the second 
jeopardy is "for the same offense" as was the first. That was not the 
case here. The homicide charged against the accused in the Court of 
First Instance and the assault and battery for which he was tried 
before the justice of the peace, although identical in some of their 
elements, were distinct offenses both in law and fact. The death of the 
injured person was the principal element of the homicide, but was no 
part of the assault and battery. At the time of the trial for the latter 
the death had not ensued, and not until it did ensue was the homicide 
committed. Then, and not before, was it possible to put the accused 
in jeopardy for that offense. Besides, under the Philippine law, the 
justice of the peace, although possessed of jurisdiction to try the 
accused for assault and battery, was without jurisdiction to try him for 
homicide; and, of course, the jeopardy incident to the trial before the 
justice did not extend to an offense beyond his jurisdiction . . . . It 
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follows that the plea of former jeopardy disclosed no obstacle to the 
prosecution for homicide.76 
Diaz was decided long before the Court proclaimed Blockburger as a 
general test of double jeopardy sameness; but recent cases have made clear that 
Diaz still lives.77 But what exactly does Diaz mean, and how can it be 
squared with Blockburger] Read narrowly, Diaz applies only when the greater 
offense has not even occurred at the time of the first trial. In the 1977 case of 
Brown v. Ohio,1* the Court, in a footnote, admitted that Diaz might sweep 
somewhat more broadly: "An exception [to Blockburger] may exist where the 
State is unable to proceed on the more serious charge at the outset because the 
additional facts necessary to sustain that charge have not occurred or have not 
been discovered despite the exercise of due diligence. See Diaz . . . ."79 But 
even this is far too narrow a reading of Diaz?and not merely because the 
Court acknowledged only that an exception may exist. Read most sweepingly, 
Diaz contradicts the very claim in Brown's text accompanying its Diaz 
footnote: "The greater offense is therefore by definition the 'same' for purposes 
of double jeopardy as any lesser offense included in it . . . . Whatever the 
sequence may be, the Fifth Amendment forbids successive prosecution ... for 
a greater and lesser included offense."80 
Without this sweeping?and obviously wrong?textual claim, Brown's 
holding is hard to defend: The Brown Court precluded a trial on auto theft 
because of an earlier conviction on the lesser-included offense of joyriding, in 
a case where there was no real hint that bifurcation was a result of 
prosecutorial manipulation, harassment, vindictiveness, or bad faith.81 
Eight years after Brown, the Court took a great, if somewhat 
unselfconscious, step away from Blockburger and Brown, and back towards a 
sweeping reading of Diaz. In Garrett v. United States,*2 the Court upheld a 
76. Diaz v. United States, 223 U.S. 442, 448-49 (1912) (citations omitted). 
77. For recent favorable citations of Diaz, see, e.g., Rutledge v. United States, 116 S. Ct. 1241, 1250 
n.17 (1996); Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 516 n.7 (1990); Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 
791-93 (1985); id. at 796-98 (O'Connor, J., concurring); id. at 803-04 (Stevens, J., dissenting); Brown v. 
Ohio, 432 U.S. 161, 169 n.7 (1977); and Jeffers v. United States, 432 U.S. 137, 151-52 (1977) (plurality 
opinion). See also Illinois v. Vitale, 447 U.S. 410, 420 n.8 (1980) (referring to Diaz principle, but not by 
name). 
78. 432 U.S. 161 (1977). 
79. Id. at 169 n.7 (emphasis added). 
80. Id. at 168-69 (emphasis added). 
81. Nothing in the Brown Court's opinion suggests any governmental bad faith. Thus we may assume 
that the police in the county where Brown was caught and immediately charged with joyriding simply did 
not know of the prosecutorial plans of charging authorities from another county, where the defendant had 
stolen the car nine days earlier. 
Brown also raised a double-counting issue: Should Brown have received a setoff for the one month 
he served for joyriding against his six-month car theft sentence? But this concern should not have precluded 
a second trial itself; it merely went to the proper amount of additional punishment to be meted out after 
a second conviction. 
82. 471 U.S. 773 (1985). 
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continuing criminal enterprise (CCE) prosecution against a man who had 
already been convicted of a lesser-included predicate drug felony. (The CCE 
statute required proof of three predicate offenses as evidence that a person was 
engaged in a continuing criminal enterprise.)83 The Garrett Court noted that 
in some cases, a trial for a predicate offense could take place before the other 
predicate offenses?and thus the CCE offense?had even occurred.84 This 
tracks the narrowest reading of Diaz. The Court went on to suggest that even 
if the other crimes had occurred, the government, despite due diligence, would 
not always have evidence of this at the time of the first trial.85 This tracks the 
Brown footnote's somewhat broader reading of Diaz. The Court also hinted 
that even if the government had such evidence, it should not necessarily have 
to tip off the defendant about ongoing undercover operations in order to 
prosecute for an initial predicate offense.86 (A still broader reading of Diaz.) 
And most strikingly, the Court began its entire analysis by saying: "Quite 
obviously the CCE offense is not, in any commonsense or literal meaning of 
the term, the 'same' offense as one of the predicate offenses."87 This is the 
broadest reading of Diaz?and a reading which, if taken seriously, demolishes 
Blockburger, and leaves us instead with a more supple fact- and case-specific 
due process analysis asking when mandatory joinder makes functional good 
sense to protect defendants against prosecutorial manipulation and harassment. 
3. Blockburger Box Three: The Implicit Acquittal Principle 
Consider next the third Blockburger quadrant, where a defendant seeks to 
plead a prior acquittal on a greater offense. Suppose that Robin is tried for 
armed robbery and is acquitted by the jury. May the state turn around and try 
her for robbery? 
Blockburger says no, and usually this makes good sense. The proper 
reasoning here is not that of avoiding double-counting or double 
punishment?for the first trial resulted in no punishment. Rather, the reasoning 
in this Blockburger quadrant rests on the idea of implicit acquittal. 
At an armed robbery trial, a jury can ordinarily decide to convict the 
defendant of any lesser-included offense supported by the evidence. In the 
federal system, for example, Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 31(c) 
provides that "[t]he defendant may be found guilty of an offense necessarily 
included in the offense charged or of an attempt to commit either the offense 
charged or an offense necessarily included therein."88 Thus, at Robin's first 
83. See id. at 775. 
84. See id. at 788-89, 791-93. 
85. See id. at 789. 
86. See id. at 789-90. 
87. Id.atlU. 
88. Fed. R. Crim. P. 31(c). 
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(armed robbery) trial, she was in actual peril?in jeopardy?of a conviction for 
robbery. Under the well-established rule of Green v. United States,*9 when 
a jury renders an explicit verdict on one count in an indictment, but says 
nothing about another count, its silence is often best construed as an implicit 
acquittal. And so, ordinarily, Robin can plead autrefois acquit in her second 
trial because she really was tried for robbery?the same offense, la meme 
felonie?in the first trial, and was acquitted.90 
Lest it seem that Blockburger always gets it right?in this quadrant at 
least?we must note that here, too, Blockburger's mindless equation of greater 
and lesser offenses is both over- and underinclusive. In a few rare situations, 
a trier of fact is not permitted to convict on a lesser-included charge, and in 
these contexts a prior acquittal should not always stand as a bar, where the 
acquittal was based on the government's failure to prove elements unique to 
the greater charge.91 As the Court noted in the prominent 1889 case, In re 
Nielsen:92 
[I]n order that an acquittal may be a bar to a subsequent indictment 
for the lesser crime, it would seem to be essential that a conviction of 
such crime might have been had under the indictment for the greater. 
If a conviction might have been had, and was not, there was an 
implied acquittal. But, where a conviction for a less crime cannot be 
had under an indictment for a greater which includes it, there it is 
plain that . . . an acquittal would not or might not be a bar . . . ,93 
Conversely, suppose Roberta is explicitly acquitted in her first trial of bank 
robbery, and the state then seeks to prosecute her for armed robbery arising 
from the same events. Bank robbery and armed robbery are not the same under 
Blockburger?and so Blockburger would allow a second trial?but surely this 
second trial should be barred. If Roberta's first jury implicitly acquitted her of 
robbery, she cannot later be charged with the same robbery; and afortiori she 
89. 355 U.S. 184, 190-91 (1957) (stating that when jury convicts on lesser-included offense without 
rendering explicit verdict on greater offense, "the great majority of cases in this country have regarded the 
jury's verdict as an implicit acquittal on the [greater] charge .... [WJe believe [this implicit acquittal 
assumption] legitimate.") (alternative holding); see also Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 533-34 (1990) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) ('"Thus an acquittal on an indictment for murder will be a good bar to an indictment 
for manslaughter [because] had the defendant been guilty, not of murder but of manslaughter, he would 
have been found guilty ofthe latter offence upon that indictment . . . .'") (quoting Commonwealth v. Roby, 
30 Mass. (12 Pick.) 496, 504 (1832)), overruled by United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993). 
90. The attentive reader will note that here, at least, the Double Jeopardy Clause itself can bear the 
load?perhaps, however, with a little help from lenity principles construing the jury's arguably ambiguous 
verdict as an implicit acquittal on robbery. 
91. For further elaboration, see Amar & Marcus, supra note 66, at 33. 
92. 131 U.S. 176(1889). 
93. Id. at 189-90 (emphasis added); see also Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 531-32 (1990) (Scalia, 
J., dissenting) (unselfconsciously quoting similar observation of Charles Petersdorff in 1825), overruled by 
United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993). 
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cannot later be charged with the same robbery with a gun.94 (To think 
otherwise would be like saying that a person cannot be twice put in jeopardy; 
but thrice is just fine.) 
The key point in this quadrant is not that greater and lesser-included 
offenses are somehow the same. Rather, it is that when a defendant is 
implicitly acquitted of, say, robbery, that acquittal bars all further charges that 
necessarily travel through that robbery. To see this more clearly still, let us 
consider the final Blockburger box, and the all-important constitutional right 
of collateral estoppel. 
4. Blockburger Box Four: The Collateral Estoppel Principle 
If Robin is first tried for robbery and explicitly acquitted, can she later be 
tried for armed robbery? Surely not, says Blockburger?and here, at last, 
Blockburger is surely right. 
But even though Blockburger is surely right in this quadrant?it never 
overprotects Robin?it does underprotect other defendants. Consider, for 
example, defendant Robert whom the government claims was involved in a 
robbery and then a closely related intentional murder. The government tries 
Robert for robbery, and Robert claims mistaken identity: He was off on a six- 
month trek in Nepal at the time of the crime. If the jury acquits, may the 
government then bring a murder prosecution? 
Blockburger would say yes?first-degree murder and robbery are not the 
same offense under its test?but we should say no. Under the constitutional 
principle of collateral estoppel, once a criminal defendant has prevailed against 
the government on an issue of ultimate fact, he should not be forced to 
continue to relitigate it criminally. As the Court made clear in the famous Ashe 
v. Swenson case in 1970,95 the Constitution "surely protects a man who has 
been acquitted from having to 'run the gantlet' a second time."96 Without this 
principle, the government could keep prosecuting an acquitted defendant over 
and over on slightly different charges, wearing him down and increasing the 
chance that one odd jury might convict him of something. This conviction 
could occur even though the defendant is innocent, and prevailed on a key 
factual issue?such as his whereabouts during a crime spree?in a previous 
trial. 
94. Cf Corbin, 495 U.S. at 531 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("'But if one charge consists of the 
circumstances A. B. C. and another of the circumstances A. D. E., then, if[A] does not itself constitute a 
distinct substantive offense, an acquittal from the one charge cannot include an acquittal of the other.'") 
(quoting 1 Thomas Starkie, Criminal Pleading 323 (2d ed. 1822)) (emphasis added). 
95. 397 U.S. 436 (1970). 
96. Id. at 446 (quoting Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 190 (1957)). 
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Ashe claimed that its collateral estoppel rule came from the Double 
Jeopardy Clause, not the Due Process Clause,97 but this cannot quite be taken 
seriously; for Ashe applied its collateral estoppel rule to bar a second trial for 
an offense that was, strictly speaking, not the same offense in fact and law, nor 
even a greater or lesser-included offense. Rather, the Court's theory was that 
Bob Ashe's first jury acquitted him because it accepted his claim of mistaken 
identity, and that therefore he could not be charged with other offenses arising 
from the same set of events.98 
Several points need to be made about the deep due process principle of 
collateral estoppel. First, as with Winship's asymmetric allocation of the 
burden of proof in criminal cases,99 the principle is openly asymmetric in a 
prodefendant direction. The Ashe collateral estoppel principle bars the 
government from relitigating an issue of fact resolved in the defendant's favor; 
but it does not bar a defendant from later contesting an issue once decided in 
the government's favor.100 Second, the principle is a special boon to the 
innocent. Whereas the formal rules of the Double Jeopardy Clause apply 
equally to autrefois acquit and autrefois convict, the collateral estoppel 
principle aids a defendant who is in effect acquitted on some contested 
issue.101 Third, as a result of these two features of collateral estoppel, most 
prosecutors will be powerfully discouraged from attempting to bifurcate 
litigation in search of strategic advantage or to vex defendants.102 If a 
prosecutor wins the first trial, she will have to prove everything all over again 
in a second criminal case; but if she loses on any issue, she loses that issue 
forever (in criminal cases, at least) against the defendant. Thus, the Ashe due 
process principle, properly understood, puts real teeth into our earlier due 
process principle frowning on manipulative bifurcation. 
97. This claim enabled the Ashe Court to sidestep an earlier case with virtually identical facts, decided 
against the defendant under the Due Process Clause. See Hoag v. New Jersey, 356 U.S. 464 (1958). But 
the Ashe Court could have distinguished away Hoag simply by reinterpreting due process in light of the 
intervening incorporation of the Double Jeopardy Clause against states in Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 
784, 793-96 (1969). This intervening event, the Court should have argued, properly exerted a new 
gravitational pull on due process principles. See infra text accompanying note 143. 
98. Ashe was suspected of having robbed six poker players around a poker table. In his first trial, the 
government prosecuted him for robbing one of the players, Donald Knight, and Ashe won an acquittal on 
grounds of mistaken identity. In the second trial, Ashe was charged with a formally different robbery?of 
one of the other five players. Each robbery was a distinct offense for "unit of prosecution" purposes, see 
supra text accompanying note 59; in other words, Ashe could initially have been charged with six offenses, 
received six convictions, and served six cumulative sentences, see Ashe, 397 U.S. at 446. 
99. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362-64 (1970) (finding due process requires governmental proof 
beyond reasonable doubt in criminal cases). 
100. See Ashe, 397 U.S. at 443 (noting "lack of 'mutuality'") (citation omitted); see also Simpson v. 
Florida, 403 U.S. 384, 386 (1971) (per curiam) (reaffirming lack of "mutuality"; convicted defendant is not 
estopped in second trial from denying facts resolved against him in first trial). 
101. This factor should be especially important for those who believe, as I do, that constitutional 
criminal procedure should protect the innocent from erroneous conviction without needlessly advantaging 
the guilty. See generally AMAR, supra note 48. 
102. See United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 710 n.15 (1993) (noting that because of Ashe 
asymmetry, prosecutors "have little to gain and much to lose from [a bifurcation] strategy"). 
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Finally, to get maximum protection from the Ashe principle, a defendant 
should be given the right to request a specific verdict from the first trier of fact 
so as to make clear precisely which issues?which elements, which ultimate 
facts?were decided in his favor. In light of a strong constitutional tradition 
upholding both the defendant's and the jury's right to a general jury 
verdict103?a simple "guilty" or "not guilty"?the most sensible approach 
would be to allow (but not oblige) the defendant to request specific findings 
from the jury after the jury has rendered its general verdict. The jury would 
then be allowed (but not obliged) to provide these findings, which would then 
furnish a solid basis for any Ashe claim a defendant might later assert.104 
With this regime in place, an acquitted (alleged robber/murderer) Robert 
could benefit just as much as an acquitted (alleged robber/bank robber) Robin 
from the true constitutional principle at issue here. The key constitutional idea 
in this quadrant is not that two formally different offenses are somehow the 
same under the Double Jeopardy Clause?two different offenses are never the 
same, and no amount of judicial gibberish can make them so. Rather, the key 
idea is that, as a matter of due process, once a defendant has prevailed in a 
criminal case on a certain factual issue, he need not prove it all over again in 
a subsequent criminal case. 
5. Beyond the Boxes: Applying the Framework 
We have seen that Blockburger's test often gets it wrong in the four boxes. 
Moreover, no single test can work across all four boxes, given that each box 
contains a different cluster of functional issues. A better framework of 
analysis, I suggest, would insist that "same offense" means just that under the 
Double Jeopardy Clause, and would directly vindicate residual functional 
concerns using the Due Process Clause. With this revised framework of 
analysis in place, we are now in a position to sort out the real issues at stake 
in the Supreme Court's major double jeopardy decisions in the 1990s. 
The decade began on an off note with the 1990 case of Grady v. 
Corbin.105 Thomas Corbin was a drunk driver whose criminal behavior killed 
one person and seriously injured another. After pleading guilty to a couple of 
traffic tickets before the Town Justice Court, Corbin claimed that the Double 
103. The jury's right to a general verdict is intimately connected to the jury's right to acquit against 
the evidence. I do not challenge this right here?on the contrary. See infra text accompanying notes 152, 
157-58, 167. 
104. For earlier discussions of this point, see Amar & Marcus, supra note 66, at 33 n. 166, and Cynthia 
L. Randall, Comment, Acquittals in Jeopardy: Criminal Collateral Estoppel and the Use of Acquitted Act 
Evidence, 141 U. Pa. L. Rev. 283, 317-25 (1992). Presumably, the voting rule in the jury for any special 
verdict would be the same one prescribed by domestic law for general verdicts. Note that, under a broad 
view of Ashe's asymmetry, a defendant who prevails on a given issue could have the right not only to 
prevent any future criminal prosecution based on that issue, but also to vacate any past criminal conviction 
so based. 
105. 495 U.S. 508 (1990). 
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Jeopardy Clause barred a later prosecution for reckless manslaughter and 
criminally negligent homicide. The Supreme Court, by a five-to-four vote, 
agreed. 
To most people?myself included?the idea that the traffic offenses of 
driving on the wrong side of the road and driving while drunk are the same 
offense as criminally negligent homicide seems outrageous. So too does the 
idea that, by paying his $360 traffic tickets, Corbin deserved a "get out of jail 
free" card immunizing him from all serious prosecution. How on earth did five 
Justices (four of whom now no longer sit) reach this outlandish result? 
Not by strictly applying Blockburger, since even under its decidedly 
expansive definition of sameness, Thomas Corbin would have lost. (Being 
drunk and on the wrong side of the road were not formal elements of the key 
offenses charged in the second trial; and dead bodies were surely no part of 
the traffic tickets.) But perhaps Blockburger's strained approach to the words 
"same offense," equating small crimes with bigger ones, emboldened the 
Corbin Court: One good stretch deserves another. The key fact, in the Court's 
mind, was that in the second trial, the state would "prove conduct that 
constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been 
prosecuted"106?would prove, in other words, that Corbin was drunk and on 
the wrong side of the road as evidence (not elements) of his criminal 
negligence and recklessness. But this cannot be a Double Jeopardy Clause test 
because, as we have seen, double jeopardy is a pretrial plea; and before the 
trial, we often do not know exactly what factual conduct the prosecution will 
ultimately point to, and what evidence the state will ultimately invoke, to prove 
the formal elements of the offense.107 (Suppose, for example, the state 
planned to prove Corbin's negligence and recklessness by pointing to his 
speeding, and not his drinking.) Thus, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not 
sensibly apply to factual conduct and evidence that will be proved in a second 
trial, but rather to the legal offense and elements that have been formally 
alleged in a second indictment, a second jeopardy. (Blockburger, whatever its 
other flaws, at least focuses squarely on legal offenses themselves, as defined 
in statute books and alleged in indictments.) 
Of course, the Constitution does protect a defendant in a conduct-based as 
well as an offense-based inquiry, but only where a second trial tries to "prove 
conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defendant has already been 
[acquitted.]"10* This is the key principle of Ashe v. Swenson;109 but as we 
have seen, this is a due process principle designed to protect the innocent. The 
106. Id. at521. 
107. Justice Scalia has made this point well. See id. at 529-30 (Scalia, J., dissenting); see also supra 
text accompanying notes 54-57. 
108. Cf. supra text accompanying note 106. 
109. 397 U.S. 436 (1970). 
1997] Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple 1831 
Corbin Court repeatedly invoked Ashe and various other prior acquittal 
cases,110 and tried to apply symmetrically their lessons to the prior conviction 
context, substituting "prosecuted' for "acquitted' as the key test. The Double 
Jeopardy Clause is indeed symmetric?in Corbin's words, itbars "[s]uccessive 
prosecutions . . . whether following acquittals or convictions"111?but the 
collateral estoppel principle at the heart of Ashe is not. The obvious difference 
between Bob Ashe and Thomas Corbin is that Bob Ashe's first trial 
proclaimed him innocent of the conduct the state later tried to prove against 
him.112 
Finally, the Corbin Court raised the specter of manipulative government 
bifurcation and vexation: 
If Blockburger constituted the entire double jeopardy inquiry in the 
context of successive prosecutions, the State could try Corbin in four 
consecutive trials: for failure to keep right of the median, for driving 
while intoxicated, for assault, and for homicide. The State could 
improve its presentation of proof with each trial, assessing which 
witnesses gave the most persuasive testimony, which documents had 
the greatest impact, and which opening and closing arguments most 
persuaded the jurors. Corbin would be forced either to contest each of 
these trials or to plead guilty to avoid the harassment and 
expense.113 
This argument fails on several counts. To begin with, it is quite far afield 
from the facts of Corbin, which involved not a manipulative, strategic, or 
vexatious prosecutorial juggernaut, but a bumbling bureaucracy. The state 
prosecutor had no clue in the Town Justice Court proceedings, and so this case 
was miles from any constitutional cap on prosecutorial bad faith. Second, even 
if Blockburger?or something less, like same-means-same?"constituted the 
entire double jeopardy inquiry," the state would not be free to try Corbin four 
times without constraint so long as other constitutional principles applied. The 
most important one here is Ashe, for it gives the state a strong disincentive to 
split one case into four for strategic reasons. Whenever the state prevails on 
a contested issue in the first trial, it will have to prove it all over again in later 
trials, but if it loses once on an issue, it loses forever. As we have seen, 
however, the Ashe principle is asymmetric, designed to protect defendants (like 
110. See Corbin, 495 U.S. at 518 n.8, 518-19. 
111. Id. at518. 
112. See id. at 528 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (affirming Ashe's conduct-based analysis where earlier 
adjudication resolved factual issue "w the defendant's favor") (emphasis added); United States v. Dixon, 
509 U.S. 688, 705 (1993) ("[Ashe] may bar a later prosecution for a separate offense where the Government 
has lost an earlier prosecution involving the same facts. But this does not establish that the Government 
'must . . . bring its prosecutions . . . together.' It is entirely free to bring them separately, and can win 
convictions in both."). 
113. Corbin, 495 U.S. at 520-21 (citation omitted). 
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Bob Ashe) who prevail on contested issues and not defendants (like Thomas 
Corbin) who lose on those issues. 
The striking injustice of Corbin is highly reminiscent of the claim rejected 
in Diaz, where a defendant pled guilty to a petty offense in a petty court, paid 
a petty fine, and then tried to use this to shield himself from a fair trial on his 
overall guilt. Corbin tucked Diaz away in a casual footnote,114 a la Brown, 
paying no heed to Diaz's same-means-same language and ignoring its 
interesting argument that because a petty court simply had no jurisdiction over 
a major offense like homicide, the defendant could not possibly have been 
previously in jeopardy on the greater offense. One wonders whether Town 
Justice Traffic Courts in New York are equipped to try serious criminal 
charges; surely there are good reasons for trying traffic offenses in special 
traffic courts, under special procedures?perhaps without juries. Thus, the 
mandatory joinder demand implicit in Corbin?try everything together in one 
proceeding?seems hard to defend as an unyielding constitutional command 
on the facts of this case. 
Three years later, the Supreme Court overruled Corbin, by a five-to-four 
vote in United States v. Dixon.115 Four Justices (only two of whom remain 
on the Court) proclaimed that Corbin was right;116 but the other five Justices 
insisted that Blockburger constituted the sole test of sameness. However, these 
five could not agree on what Blockburger meant. Three thought that by no 
stretch of imagination could a fifteen-year drug offense be seen as a logical 
lesser-included offense of a six-month contempt of court offense;117 two 
Justices disagreed, and thus voted in the end with the Corbin four to immunize 
Alvin Dixon from drug prosecution because he had earlier been convicted of 
contempt for violating a court order not to commit crimes while on bail.118 
The mind boggles here: Contempt of court and drug pushing are somehow "the 
same"; a fifteen-year offense is somehow "lesser" than a six-month offense; 
because someone is found guilty of a small crime he must be set free on his 
big crime?and all this from Justice Scalia, who usually claims he believes in 
plain meaning and common sense.119 
114. Seeid. at 516 n.7. 
115. 509 U.S. 688, 704 (1993). 
116. See id. at 740 (White, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); id. at 741 
(Blackmun, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part); id. at 744 (Souter, J., joined by 
Stevens, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
117. See id. at 718 (Rehnquist, C.J., joined by O'Connor & Thomas, JJ., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
118. See id. at 697-700 (Scalia, J., joined by Kennedy, J.) 
119. See, e.g., California v. Acevedo, 500 U.S. 565, 581-85 (1991) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment) 
(championing plain meaning and commonsensical approach to Fourth Amendment reasonableness); Minnick 
v. Mississippi, 498 U.S. 146, 166-67 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (arguing for plain meaning and 
commonsensical understanding of Fifth Amendment compulsion under Self-Incrimination Clause); see also 
Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 529-30, 540-43 (1990) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (rejecting majority analysis 
on textual grounds that "offense" in Double Jeopardy Clause means legally-defined crime, not factual 
transaction, and that "put in jeopardy" precludes second trial itself, thus calling for pretrial plea; and on 
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Even good Justices have bad days. Here is how Justice Scalia should have 
analyzed Dixon in keeping with his commitment to text and common sense: 
Alvin Dixon has no good core Double Jeopardy Clause argument since he had 
never been previously convicted or acquitted of the same fifteen-year drug 
offense with which he is now charged. Nor does he have any good claim 
against double-counting since Congress clearly intended contempt of court and 
drug offenses to be punished cumulatively (and even if not, this would argue 
only for a six-month setoff in the second case, not a fifteen-year windfall). Nor 
does he have any good implicit acquittal or Ashe-type argument, since he has 
never been acquitted of anything. Finally, to try his drug conduct in two 
separate proceedings is not constitutionally vexatious because a single hybrid 
proceeding should not be constitutionally required here under mandatory 
joinder principles. It is legitimate for the government to litigate contempt in a 
separate proceeding from other crimes, since a minor contempt is subject to 
special procedural rules (no jury, for example).120 In this sense, the juryless 
tribunal that adjudged Dixon's contempt did not even have "jurisdiction" over 
his big drug crime?a scenario strikingly reminiscent of Diaz. 
The following year, the Court again split five-to-four in a major double 
jeopardy case, Department of Revenue v. Kurth Ranch.ni Montana criminally 
prosecuted and convicted members of the Kurth family on various drug 
charges. After these convictions became final and sentences were imposed, 
Montana continued to press civil charges against the Kurths based on a special, 
highly punitive civil law imposing special taxes on illegal drugs. The Court, 
holding that the second, civil trial, was aimed at "the same conduct"122 as the 
first, sided with the Kurths and blocked the civil suit on double jeopardy 
grounds. 
Kurth Ranch is exceedingly hard to square with Dixon, decided only a year 
earlier.123 Dixon overruled Corbin and insisted on Blockburger as the sole 
test of sameness. But Kurth nowhere applied the Blockburger test, under which 
the civil and criminal charges seem obviously different.124 In its key 
passages?indeed in its opening sentence?Kurth stressed that the two trials 
commonsensical grounds that majority approach would be unworkable and would lead to absurd results), 
overruled by United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993). 
120. See Dixon, 509 U.S. at 692-93 (describing bench trial in contempt proceeding). According to the 
Court, the Constitution does not require a jury in a "petty" criminal case where the authorized term of 
imprisonment is six months or less. See Baldwin v. New York, 399 U.S. 66 (1969); Bloom v. Illinois, 391 
U.S. 194(1968). 
121. 114 S. Ct. 1937(1994). 
122. Id. at 1941. 
123. This point is made well in King, supra note 61, at 120-22. 
124. See id. at 121 (noting that civil and criminal statutes contained different elements, and that 
Montana legislature intended them as separate and cumulative sanctions). How, exactly, could Montana 
enforce both laws against a single person on the Kurth Court's view? By bringing a single hybrid civil- 
criminal case? It seems hard to say that such a virtually unprecedented proceeding could really be required 
by the Constitution. 
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focused on "the same conduct,"125 but this is precisely the Corbin-five test 
rejected by the Dixon five in favor of Blockburger's focus on legal offenses 
and elements rather than factual conduct. Kurth was authored by Justice 
Stevens?the only member of the Corbin five who still sits on the High 
Court?and his opinion was joined by only one of the (anti-Corbin) Dixon 
five, Justice Kennedy. 
What Kurth said makes little sense. Following a case from 1989,126 
Kurth held that the Double Jeopardy Clause could apply to a civil trial 
involving only money. In light of the "life or limb" clause, this seems a real 
stretch.127 If Kurth was in effect saying that the civil suit was really a 
criminal wolf disguised in civil sheep's clothing, well and good?but then the 
Double Jeopardy Clause was the least of the state's problems. If the second 
suit was really criminal, it called for the entire panoply of applicable 
constitutional safeguards?appointed counsel, proof beyond reasonable doubt, 
and so forth128?and yet the Court seemed to think that none of these other 
protections applied. Since double jeopardy is formally symmetric between 
acquittal and conviction, does Kurth mean that if the Kurths had won in the 
criminal trial?because the state could not prove their drug conduct beyond 
reasonable doubt?then the state would be barred from trying to prove that 
same conduct, in a civil case, under a preponderance-of-the-evidence test?129 
Since the precise sequence of trials should make no difference under the 
Double Jeopardy Clause, does this mean that if the Kurths had rushed forward 
and paid their civil drug tax first, they would have been forever immune from 
all criminal prosecution? 
But perhaps the Kurth Court?with Justice Kennedy as the key vote?was 
onto something after all, and just failed to package its intuition well. Even if 
the Double Jeopardy Clause is inapplicable to civil cases involving only 
money, the Due Process Clause surely applies to all proceedings involving life, 
liberty, or property. Due process protects a defendant's right to collateral 
estoppel in suits against the government, and frowns on vexatious and 
vindictive successive prosecutions, civil or criminal. But a particular problem 
exists where a state first criminally prosecutes, and then litigates in a civil suit 
after the criminal suit has ended. A vindictive prosecutor who wins a criminal 
conviction, but gets a lower punishment than she sought, or who loses a 
criminal suit, may be tempted to go after the defendant again in a civil 
125. 114 S. Ct. at 1941; see id. at 1943 ("the same criminal conduct"); id. at 1947 ("the precise 
conduct"). 
126. See United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989) (holding that double jeopardy bars civil penalty 
proceeding filed after criminal conviction). 
127. See supra Part I. 
128. See Kurth, 114 S. Ct. at 1960 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
129. But see infra note 132. 
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suit.130 Ordinarily, this temptation to bifurcate strategically and to double-dip 
is constrained ex ante by Ashe v. Swenson.m A prosecutor knows that if she 
wins on a given issue, she must always prove it all over again in another trial, 
but if she loses once, she loses forever; therefore she has strong ex ante 
incentives to try to consolidate everything into one round. But where the state 
sues first criminally and then civilly, Ashe may have less bite. If the state loses 
the first, criminal trial, it can claim that this is only because it failed to prove 
something beyond reasonable doubt; this failure, it can claim, should not estop 
it from trying to prove that same thing in a later civil case by a preponderance 
ofthe evidence.132 
As a result of the relative weakness of Ashe in deterring vindictive 
multiple proceedings ex ante where criminal suits are followed by civil suits, 
courts must be especially vigilant to protect against vindictiveness ex post. The 
best analogy here is to the North Carolina v. Pearce133 line of cases 
constraining vindictiveness in the resentencing context, a line in which the 
Court has explicitly rejected a rigid double jeopardy analysis in favor of a 
more flexible due process approach focused squarely on vindictiveness.134 
If this is indeed the best thing that can be said on Kurth's behalf?and I 
think it is?it has profound implications for so-called reverse-Kurth cases now 
percolating in lower courts.135 In these cases, citizens in various civil suits 
rush forward to pay their civil drug taxes and then claim that they may never 
130. The facts of Kurth itself were rather more complicated than in Halper. In Halper, the civil 
penalty proceeding was initially filed after the conclusion of the criminal case; in Kurth, civil proceedings 
were initiated while the criminal suit was pending, and continued after the criminal suit ended. The 
sequence of events in Halper raised a stronger inference of prosecutorial vindictiveness than in Kurth. Cf. 
Halper, 490 U.S. at 451 n.10 ("[W]hen the Government already has imposed a criminal penalty and seeks 
to impose additional punishment in a second proceeding, the Double Jeopardy Clause protects against the 
possibility that the Government is seeking the second punishment because it is dissatisfied with the sanction 
obtained in the first proceeding."). 
131. 397 U.S. 436 (1970). 
132. Cf. Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342, 347-50 (1990). In this case, the Court declined to 
use Ashe to bar the government from introducing evidence that the defendant had in fact committed an 
earlier crime, for which he had been previously acquitted. The Court reasoned that the second jury could 
believe that even though defendant was not guilty of the first crime beyond reasonable doubt he was 
nonetheless probably guilty, and that this probable guilt was relevant to his guilt beyond reasonable doubt 
of the second crime. Put a different way, since the government did not need to prove in the second case 
that the defendant committed the first crime beyond a reasonable doubt, its theory was not logically 
inconsistent with the earlier acquittal. For similar discussions of the hole in collateral estoppel created by 
the gap between the reasonable doubt and preponderance standards, see United States v. One Assortment 
of89 Firearms, 465 U.S. 354, 361-62 (1984); and One Lot Emerald Cut Stones v. United States, 409 U.S. 
232, 235 (1972) (per curiam). 
133. 395 U.S. 711 (1969). 
134. See, e.g., id. (using Due Process Clause to constrain judicial vindictiveness toward defendant who 
successfully overturns judge's ruling on appeal and then faces stiffer sentence on retrial; judge must 
specifically justify sentence increase); Wasman v. United States, 468 U.S. 559 (1984) (further elaborating 
Pearce); cf United States v. Goodwin, 457 U.S. 368, 372, 384 (1982) (using Due Process Clause to 
prohibit prosecutorial vindictiveness toward defendant who exercises right to jury trial, but requiring 
specific proof of vindictiveness); Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21 (1974) (using Due Process Clause to 
constrain prosecutorial vindictiveness toward defendant who exercises right to appeal). 
135. Several of these cases are discussed in King, supra note 61, at 123 n.70. 
1836 The Yale Law Journal [Vol. 106: 1807 
be criminally prosecuted for the basic underlying drug conduct. Such cases are 
the "reverse" of Kurth because the civil suits come first here. If Kurth is 
indeed a true and pure Double Jeopardy Clause case, it is hard to deny the 
logic of clever drug dealers who insist that under this Clause, the sequence of 
trial matters not. But the basic equities in these cases?where plainly guilty 
people are never even tried for their crimes?feel rather different from the 
equities in Kurth itself, and a supple due process recharacterization of Kurth 
can help explain why these cases feel so different. When a civil case is 
litigated first, a defendant who prevails will be able to use Ashe to shield 
himself from an abusive criminal suit: If the state could not prove the drug 
conduct by a preponderance-of-the-evidence standard, it surely should be 
estopped from claiming the conduct occurred beyond reasonable doubt. Since 
Ashe works ex ante here to deter strategic bifurcation, much less ex post 
Kurth-like judicial protection is called for. And so even if Kurth is right (in 
result), it should not extend to reverse-jrvwrt/z cases. 
Last term, a reverse-Kurth case did reach the Court, via the Sixth Circuit, 
in United States v. Ursery.136 The Justices, however, managed to sidestep any 
real analysis of the key "same offense" issues.137 At a couple of points, the 
Court came close to claiming that the civil suit at hand was merely an in rem 
action directed against a particular piece of drug-related property itself (here, 
a house)?and not against Guy Jerome Ursery himself, the owner and occupant 
of the house. On this in rem logic, Ursery could not claim that he had ever 
been previously convicted or acquitted in any way that would bar his criminal 
prosecution.138 The in rem gimmick here is a plausible and ancient one;139 
but it can lead to striking injustices if we truly buy into the fiction that the 
rights of individual persons are not really at stake in in rem actions.140 (Just 
ask Tina Bennis.141) And so the deepest lesson here is that when the 
Supreme Court overreads a clause in a prodefendant way, it often sets in 
motion a chain of events that can result in a rather drastic curtailment of 
citizens' rights somewhere else.142 
136. 116 S. Ct. 2135 (1996). At the Supreme Court, the Sixth Circuit case was consolidated with a 
case originating in the Ninth Circuit. See id. at 2138. Because the Sixth Circuit fact pattern presents a 
clearer example of reverse-^Mrf/i issues, I shall focus on it here. 
137. See id. at 2140 n.l. 
138. See id. at 2140, 2145 (relying on in rem fiction of Various Items of Personal Property v. United 
States, 282 U.S. 577, 581 (1931)). But see id. at 2148 n.3 (claiming that Court's ultimate conclusion does 
not rest on "the long-recognized fiction that a forfeiture in rem punishes only malfeasant property rather 
than a particular person"). 
139. See id. at 2140-42 (invoking congressional statute from 1789, and several nineteenth- and 
twentieth-century Supreme Court cases). 
140. See id. at 2151 (Kennedy, J., concurring) ("It is the owner who feels the pain and receives the 
stigma of the forfeiture, not the property."). 
141. See Bennis v. Michigan, 116 S. Ct. 994 (1996) (using in rem gimmick to uphold hardhearted 
forfeiture of family car against wholly innocent wife of wrongdoing husband). 
142. For many more examples of this phenomenon, see Amar, supra note 48, at 1138. 
1997] Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple 1837 
Even if no curtailment ever occurred, the overreading of the Double 
Jeopardy Clause is of course wrong in itself?and has resulted in indefensible 
windfalls to various car thieves, drunk drivers, drug pushers, and other 
criminals. The solution, I have suggested, is to heed the words of the Clause; 
and, where necessary and appropriate, to supplement those words with due 
process principles to directly protect implicit acquittals, enforce collateral 
estoppel, thwart vexatious reprosecutions, and avoid double-counting. An 
alternative approach could label these issues as "double jeopardy principles" 
but apply these principles functionally and flexibly. This alternative approach 
has the virtue of highlighting connections between the Double Jeopardy Clause 
itself and the four functional concerns we have identified. But it also poses 
some distinctive risks. Some of those functional concerns radiate far beyond 
the Double Jeopardy Clause, however broadly construed. (Double-counting, for 
example, should be avoided in every case, civil or criminal.) Given the need 
to wheel in due process at some point, conceptual clarity is served if we 
directly apply due process whenever it fits best. And if we mean to have a 
genuinely flexible approach in at least some of the Blockburger boxes?to 
avoid the mindlessness and definitional foolishness of Brown and Corbin and 
Dixon?then the flexible phrasing of the Due Process Clause seems to fit 
better than the stiffer syntax of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Unless judges 
sharply distinguish between the core double jeopardy "rules"?autrefois acquit 
de meme felonie and autrefois convict de meme felonie?and various 
penumbral double jeopardy "principles," there is a real risk that the penumbra 
will be applied too rigidly (Brown, Corbin, and Dixon, for example) and/or 
that the core will be applied too mushily (the curtailment effect). Thus, the 
conceptually clearest approach is to insist that the Double Jeopardy Clause 
means just what it says, but to recognize that the principles underlying and 
radiating beyond the words of the Clause should inform due process 
analysis.143 
143. See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 87-101 (1980) (recommending that 
open-textured constitutional clauses such as Due Process be informed by values underlying more specific 
constitutional clauses); Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 757, 
804-11 (1994) (following similar approach to help define "constitutional reasonableness" under Fourth 
Amendment). 
It might be asked whether my approach leaves any independent bite to the Double Jeopardy Clause 
itself. If the Clause did not exist, couldn't the Due Process Clause itself do all the work? Perhaps, but this 
is hardly a forceful argument against a plain-meaning reading of the Double Jeopardy Clause. Many of the 
clauses of our Constitution, when best read, may simply textually clarify what would probably be the best 
reading of the Constitution, even without that clause. Many of the clauses of the Sixth Amendment, for 
example, clarify rules that might otherwise have been implicit in due process. See generally Amar, supra 
note 31. For a general discussion of the ubiquity of such clarifying clauses in our Constitution, see Akhil 
Reed Amar, Some Opinions on the Opinion Clause, 82 Va. L. Rev. 647, 648-51 (1996). 
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III. "Twice in Jeopardy" 
Let us, finally, turn to the remaining key phrase in the Double Jeopardy 
Clause: "twice in jeopardy." Even if a person clearly risks losing "life or limb" 
(in a poetic sense) for a single legal offense?"the same offense"?exactly how 
are we to decide whether he has been placed twice in jeopardy? The Court has 
approached this question by asking when jeopardy attaches, but a more precise 
analysis would bifurcate this inquiry. We must ask both when does a jeopardy 
begin and when does that same jeopardy end. Only then can we decide 
whether a particular event threatens a second jeopardy. Since the word 
jeopardy draws upon an obvious game metaphor?jeopardy is, etymologically, 
an uncertain game, a game that one might lose144?we might recast the 
question by asking when does the "game" begin and end. What exactly are the 
rules of the "game" when officials make bad calls, when the players cheat or 
commit fouls, or when external events like the weather intrude upon the game? 
As we think about these questions, and try to make them simpler to 
understand, perhaps various lessons and examples from other well-known 
games can help sort things out. 
A. The Jeopardy Game 
1. The Puzzle 
Although courts often speak of when jeopardy attaches, this attachment 
metaphor misleads to the extent that it implies that there is one key moment 
rather than two. Jeopardy is a process?like any other game?and we thus 
must ask when it begins and when it ends. Consider the puzzles any other 
approach creates. In early American courts, judges often proclaimed that 
jeopardy did not attach until the jury rendered its verdict. Thus, in 1823, 
Justice Washington proclaimed on circuit that "jeopardy" means "nothing short 
of the acquittal or conviction of the prisoner, and the judgment of the court 
thereupon."145 But textually, it seems a bit odd to say that one's 
jeopardy?one's risk, one's uncertainty?begins just at the point the 
uncertainty is resolved by a verdict. It is like saying that the game one might 
lose begins just as the final buzzer sounds. And if jeopardy connotes nothing 
less than a verdict (or a verdict and a sentence), does this mean that one is not 
put twice in jeopardy until a second verdict (or a second sentence)? Surely this 
cannot be right; for as we have seen, the Double Jeopardy Clause was clearly 
designed to be enforced by a pretrial special plea in bar to spare a person from 
144. See supra text accompanying note 24. 
145. United States v. Haskell, 26 F. Cas. 207, 212 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823) (No. 15,321). 
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the burden of the second trial itself (and indeed, from any pretrial impositions 
incident to a voidable indictment on the "same offense"). 
The motivation of the early American rule is clear: to allow a defendant 
whose first trial had not reached a final judgment of acquittal or 
conviction?say, because of a mistrial created by a hung jury or juror 
illness?to be retried. As Justice Story wrote in his classic treatise on the 
Constitution: 
[The Double Jeopardy Clause means] that a party shall not be tried a 
second time for the same offence, after he has once been convicted, 
or acquitted of the offence charged, by the verdict of a jury, and 
judgment has passed thereon for or against him. But it does not mean, 
that he shall not be tried for the offence a second time, if the jury has 
been discharged without giving any verdict; or, if, having given a 
verdict, judgment has been arrested upon it, or a new trial has been 
granted in his favor; for, in such a case, his life or limb cannot 
judicially be said to have been put in jeopardy.146 
This seems sensible enough except for the last line ("for, in such a 
case . . . 
."). Taken literally, this line would contradict Story's earlier 
statements by allowing a person to be tried after acquittal so long as the trial 
did not proceed to verdict and judgment: The defendant could "not be said to 
have been put in [a second] jeopardy." A friendly reworking of Story's last 
line would say that "although placed in jeopardy once, his first jeopardy has 
only begun, but has not ended in a final verdict of conviction or acquittal. His 
jeopardy may thus continue until a proper final verdict is reached, after which, 
of course, he may no longer be tried for the same offence." 
More modern American courts have held that jeopardy attaches much 
earlier than Story and Washington thought: at the impaneling of the jury.147 
This solves some problems, leaves others unsolved, and creates new ones of 
its own. It seems more plausible to say that the game and the risk begin before 
the end, and that a person is in genuine jeopardy throughout his trial. But he 
is in peril even earlier, given that an indictment itself can trigger pretrial loss 
of liberty?loss of the free use of one's "limbs," loss of days, weeks, or even 
months of one's "life."148 Surely we should not say to someone acquitted of 
robbery that he may be reindicted for the same robbery and held pretrial 
because, unless and until his second jury is seated, he will not be twice "in 
jeopardy." 
Now consider the trial itself. The modern rule seems superior to the earlier 
rule in some mistrials and inferior in others. Suppose the prosecutor, near the 
146. Joseph Story, Commentaries on the Constitution of the United States ? 1781, 
659-60 (Fred B. Rothman & Co. 1991) (1833). 
147. See, e.g., Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S. 28, 32-38 (1978). 
148. See Amar, supra note 31, at 658-61. 
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end of a trial, senses that things are not going well for the state, and that the 
jury will likely acquit. Out of desperation, she engages in gross and intentional 
misconduct that forces the judge to declare a mistrial. She then argues that 
because the first trial never reached a verdict and final judgment, the defendant 
can be retried on a clean slate. Under the Washington/Story definition of 
"jeopardy" perhaps this gambit might work, but not under the modern 
definition: Jeopardy has already "attached." Under the modern definition 
however, why is a retrial permissible if a mistrial results from some other, 
wholly benign, cause?like a hung jury, or juror illness? The Double Jeopardy 
Clause seems to lay down a clear rule. By what right do judges balance away 
this right, saying that some second jury impanelings and thus second 
"jeopardies" are permissible and others are not?149 
2. The Solution 
The most sensible approach, I suggest, is as follows. The Double Jeopardy 
Clause in effect says that for any given offense, the government may play the 
adjudication game only once: No person shall be "twice put in jeopardy." The 
adjudication game?highlighted by the richly poetic word "jeopardy"?begins 
when a person is indicted. Before this event, of course, there is simply no 
criminal charge on the table, and thus no way to decide whether an offense is 
la meme felonie as the offense for which a person was autrefois convict or 
acquit. What's more, once an indictment does issue, a person's "life or limb," 
in the poetic sense, is very much at risk and in jeopardy. But indictment is 
only the moment when adjudication game begins', and the adjudication game 
does not end until there is a final winner. Until there is a final winner, the first 
jeopardy has not ended, and further proceedings do not place a person in 
jeopardy a second time?"twice." 
Sometimes, a game can begin and not end; and so it must be replayed 
from the start later. Consider, for example, a baseball game that is called off 
after several innings because of rain and is then replayed on a blank scorecard 
at the end of the season. In a roughly analogous way, domestic law often 
allows a prosecutor to drop an indictment, with leave to refile?to reschedule 
the game?later.150 Sometimes, a game that seemed to end must be replayed 
because a referee erred and that error compromised the fairness of the game. 
When a linesman in tennis makes an incorrect call on which the players 
149. The Court has said that mistrials followed by retrials may be granted in cases of "manifest 
necessity." See Arizona v. Washington, 434 U.S. 497, 505 (1978). But the Court has hastened to add that 
"it is manifest that the key word 'necessity' cannot be interpreted literally." Id. at 506. More double 
jeopardy double talk? For a superb account of the actual judicial standards at work in mistrial cases, see 
Westen & Drubel, supra note 59, at 85-106. 
150. See Westen & Drubel, supra note 59, at 88, 97-99 (distinguishing between harassing and 
nonharassing indictment dismissals followed by reindictment). 
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nevertheless rely, the presiding official can overrule the call, and the point is 
simply played over. So too, domestic law should generally be allowed to 
provide that a trial judge error?even one in the defendant's favor?can be 
reversed, and a new trial ordered. The game need not end?jeopardy may 
continue?until an error-free result is obtained, and a fair winner emerges. 
Finally, a winner sometimes emerges because of the misconduct of the other 
player. A boxer who repeatedly hits his opponent with low blows is 
disqualified, and the other boxer is declared the winner. Some mistrials should 
be similarly understood: Because of the flagrant misconduct of the prosecutor, 
the defendant is simply declared the winner. Such a trial court ruling, if correct 
(and upheld on appeal), is in effect an acquittal, and thus jeopardy has indeed 
ended. 
My approach has several major implications. First, it supports Justice 
Holmes's general theory of continuing jeopardy:151 When a trial judge errs 
in favor ofthe defendant and the defendant thereby wins an alleged "acquittal" 
at trial, this "acquittal" need not be seen as the end of the game. Rather, an 
appeals court should be able to review and reverse the legal error, and remand 
for a new trial?a continuation of the game?until a suitably error-free result 
is reached. Second, my approach highlights the special role played by the Sixth 
Amendment in immunizing certain jury decisions from judicial review and 
reversals. In our system, a properly informed criminal jury given the proper 
evidence is always entitled to acquit a defendant; no other official can reverse 
that decision, no matter how "erroneous" it seems to nonjurors. On some 
issues, juries are the ultimate referees, who are infallible because they are 
final.152 Because it is the Sixth Amendment that requires certain jury 
decisions to be treated as nonerroneous acquittals, the Fifth Amendment 
Double Jeopardy Clause here merely piggybacks, specifying the legal effect of 
these acquittals in future proceedings.153 Finally, my approach helps to 
identify a range of penalties that can be imposed on players who cheat or 
commit fouls. The Due Process Clause, with its historic emphasis on fair play, 
is the obvious constitutional vehicle for implementing those penalties; and so 
the Double Jeopardy Clause itself is not really the formal source of these 
penalties?here too it merely piggybacks by specifying the consequences for 
151. See Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 134 (1904) (Holmes, J., dissenting) ("[L]ogically and 
rationally a man cannot be said to be more than once in jeopardy in the same cause, however often he may 
be tried. The jeopardy is one continuing jeopardy from its beginning to the end of the cause."). 
152. Cf Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 540 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring in judgment) ("We are 
not final because we are infallible, but we are infallible only because we are final."). 
153. Ordinarily, domestic law should define what counts as an "acquittal" just as it defines what 
counts as an "offense." And ordinarily, the Double Jeopardy Clause itself should take these domestic law 
concepts as it finds them. But just as other constitutional clauses can constrain what domestic law can treat 
as a criminal "offense"?an "offense" for example cannot be ex post facto?so here the Sixth Amendment 
demands that domestic law must treat certain events as "acquittals." See also infra text accompanying notes 
165, 168-69 (describing similar role for Due Process Clause). 
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future judicial proceedings when the form of a given penalty is, in effect, an 
acquittal. 
B. Continuing Jeopardy 
Consider first the idea of continuing jeopardy: Must a person go free 
because he wins something called an "acquittal" from a trial judge, even 
though appellate courts with general review power over the trial court deem 
the "acquittal" legally erroneous? Holmes thought not, and here Holmes was 
right.154 To begin with, surely there is nothing magic in a name or a word. 
Surely it matters not at all whether a state calls a trial judge's decision an 
"acquittal" subject to appellate review or a "bacquittal" that only ripens into 
a final and true "acquittal" if upheld on appeal. In both cases, domestic law is 
in effect saying that a trial ruling is merely provisional, not final, and should 
be subject to correction if erroneous. 
Holmes's basic idea is that a state could indeed structure its judicial 
system such that erroneous trial judge rulings are simply not final. When a 
defendant is convicted at trial because of a pro-state trial court error, an 
appellate court can review this error, reverse the conviction, and remand for 
a new trial. This new trial is not, constitutionally, a second jeopardy, but a 
continuation of the first, because the trial court "conviction" was not a true 
conviction. In effect, it was a "bonviction" that failed on appeal to ripen into 
a true "conviction." But if retrial is allowed after an erroneous trial court 
conviction, why not after an erroneous trial court acquittal?155 
The usual answer will not do:156 "When a defendant appeals a 
conviction, he waives any double jeopardy claim he might have against retrial; 
but this waiver argument does not apply when the government appeals an 
acquittal." The problem is that a defendant who appeals does not really 
"waive" anything: He does not voluntarily, knowingly, and freely relinquish 
his double jeopardy claim. He would love to win a reversal on appeal and be 
done with it?to face no further trial proceedings. But domestic law denies him 
this option: It forces him to "waive" his double jeopardy right in order to 
154. See Kepner, 195 U.S. at 134 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (quoted supra note 151); see also Palko v. 
Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937) (upholding Connecticut continuing jeopardy regime under Due Process 
Clause). Palko, of course, was decided before the Court held that the Double Jeopardy Clause directly 
applied against states via Fourteenth Amendment incorporation. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 
793-96 (1969). 
155. See Kepner, 195 U.S. at 135 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (explaining that defendant "no more would 
be put in jeopardy a second time when retried because of a mistake of law in his favor, than he would be 
when retried for a mistake that did him harm"). 
156. My analysis in this paragraph is obviously heavily indebted to Professor Peter Westen's work, 
which addresses the relevant issues with great penetration and power. I shall thus only summarize his 
arguments here; readers with any lingering doubts should directly confront Peter Westen, The Three Faces 
of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of Criminal Sentences, 78 MlCH. L. REV. 1001, 
1008-09, 1055-59 (1980); and Westen & Drubel, supra note 59, at 125-28. 
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exercise his right to appeal. Nothing in logic requires this construction (and 
constriction) of options?unlike, say, the situations where logic "forces" one 
to forgo his right to complete silence at trial if he exercises his right to speak 
at trial, or where logic "forces" one to forgo her right not to have a lawyer if 
she exercises her right to have a lawyer. It is hard to see how a defendant 
could simultaneously do X and not-X; but it is easy to imagine how, in theory, 
a defendant could first appeal, and then (if successful) go free. England, for 
example, allows defendants to appeal without generally subjecting the 
successful appellant to retrial. To put the point another way, if we insist on 
saying that a defendant implicitly waives any claim against retrial when he 
appeals, we could likewise say that he implicitly waives any claim against a 
government-appeal-driven retrial when he demands the benefit of being tried 
under nonerroneous law in the initial proceeding: Unless a defendant renounces 
the right to appeal all erroneous decisions against him, he implicitly waives the 
right to object to any governmental appeal of any erroneous decisions in his 
favor. 
One possible objection to continuing jeopardy is that although trial judges 
sometimes do err in prodefendant directions, some defendants would clearly 
have won anyway, and so it is unfair to subject these defendants to retrial. But 
this objection argues not against continuing jeopardy but for a kind of 
prodefendant "harmless error" doctrine, in which appellate courts should refuse 
to order retrials where the errors below likely did not affect the verdict. 
(Similarly, in football, if a pass was simply not catchable anyway, any pass 
interference made no difference, and so officials will not intervene.) 
A second possible objection to continuing jeopardy is a variant ofthe first: 
The initial jury may have acquitted to "nullify" the prosecution altogether, and 
appellate judges have no right?under Sixth Amendment doctrine?to disturb 
this jury prerogative. But even if a jury has a shadow right to nullify157 (a 
right that jurors are not told about), a jury also has a right not to nullify. The 
jury as an institution is not well respected if its decisions are taken as final 
even when those decisions are based on a trial judge's legally erroneous 
instructions or evidentiary rulings. No nullification prerogative would be 
threatened by correcting the trial judge's legal errors on appeal and remanding 
the case back to the same jury for retrial, this time with legally correct 
evidence and instructions.158 If the jury still wants to acquit and nullify, it 
can then do so. 
157. Here, too, I stand on the shoulders of Professor Westen, who has thoughtfully addressed the 
interplay between double jeopardy doctrine and jury nullification theory. See Westen, supra note 156, at 
1012-23; Westen & Drubel, supra note 59, at 129-32. 
158. Here, I go one step beyond Professor Westen, who seems to overlook this possibility and its 
larger logical implications. See Westen, supra note 156, at 1017 n.58; Westen & Drubel, supra note 59, 
at 130 & n.230. 
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But the Constitution probably does not require even this. Even if different 
jurors sit in the retrial, these jurors would enjoy the same shadow right to 
nullify and acquit as would the original jurors in a retrial. Constitutionally 
speaking, a second jury simply stands in the shoes of the first?just as, in a 
single trial, jury alternates may be called to stand in the shoes of jurors who 
fall sick. Perhaps a defendant prefers his first jury, but the Constitution does 
not absolutely protect that preference in all contexts. When a defendant is 
erroneously convicted?solely because of progovernment error in the first trial 
that he vigorously opposed?he may be retried by a second jury even if he 
would prefer the first. It is hard to see why his preference should be 
constitutionally stronger in a retrial triggered by a successful government 
appeal; here, the very error that causes the retrial is one that he may have 
introduced rather than one that he opposed.159 
A third objection to continuing jeopardy points to other prodefendant 
asymmetries in our criminal justice system, such as Winship's rule that the 
government bears a heavy burden of proof,160 and Ashe's openly asymmetric 
rule of collateral estoppel.161 One good asymmetry deserves another, the 
argument might go, and so it is constitutionally apt that defendants may appeal 
erroneous trial rulings but prosecutors may not. This is a bad argument chasing 
a bad analogy in fruitless search of a good reason. Other asymmetries in our 
criminal justice system are not random or purposeless; they exist to protect an 
innocent defendant from an erroneous conviction. Indeed, I have elsewhere 
suggested that this is one of the governing principles of the field of 
constitutional criminal procedure.162 But no similar constitutional value is 
served by insulating what are?by hypothesis?incorrect judicial rulings of law 
from review and reversal. Insulation here is an arbitrary windfall to the guilty, 
not a carefully structured scheme to protect the innocent. It is as if we simply 
said that every third (randomly selected) defendant should go free without good 
reason. 
A defendant has no vested right to a legal error in his favor.163 For 
159. See Westen, supra note 156, at 1009; Westen & Drubel, supra note 59, at 127-28. 
160. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 362-64 (1970). 
161. See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). 
162. See supra note 48. 
163. See Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 366, 370-71 (1993) (stating that criminal defendant is 
"not entitled" to "windfall" of incorrect application of law or to '"the luck of a lawless decisionmaker'" 
when '"the state court make[s] an error in his favor'") (citations omitted); see also United States v. Scott, 
437 U.S. 82, 91 n.7 (1978) (allowing appellate reversal of erroneous trial court acquittal, where result is 
to reinstate jury's guilty verdict). 
It might be argued that, under Ashe, we immunize an "erroneous" jury finding of fact from reversal 
by a second jury; why shouldn't we likewise immunize an "erroneous" trial judge ruling of law? The 
answer is that, in legal contemplation, we have no good reason to systematically prefer the second jury's 
finding as generally more likely to be "true" or "accurate" than the first jury's finding. Perhaps it is really 
the second jury that is erroneous in thinking that the first erred. But the entire structure of judicial appellate 
review gives us good reason to think that an appeals court?typically with more judges and more time for 
careful legal study of difficult issues?is generally more likely to be legally correct than a trial judge. Thus, 
we have structured our system so that appellate judges can generally reverse trial judges; but one jury 
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example, if a trial judge erroneously excludes evidence in a pretrial 
suppression hearing, a defendant has no constitutional right to prevent the 
government from seeking an interlocutory appeal to review and reverse this 
legal error. Subsequent proceedings are simply a continuation of the original 
jeopardy. But?constitutionally speaking?the matter is no different if appeal 
occurs after trial; here too, the subsequent proceedings are simply a 
continuation of a single jeopardy in search of a fair verdict based on the 
correct application of law. We do not demand that the defendant go free 
because the initial jurors catch fever and a new trial is ordered; why should 
things be any different if a fevered judge makes egregiously wrong legal 
rulings at trial?164 
The final objection to continuing jeopardy is that it might allow a 
government to treat a trial court's prodefendant rulings more harshly than its 
pro-state rulings. In this nightmare scenario, a trial court's pro-state rulings are 
called "convictions," and are final and unreviewable, but a trial court's 
prodefendant rulings are called "bacquittals" that do not ripen into true 
acquittals until an endless series of onerous appeals. But a simple symmetry 
rule rooted in due process would prevent the state from structuring 
decisionmaking authority in any way that endowed pro-state rulings with more 
finality than prodefendant rulings.165 
cannot generally reverse another. 
In addition, as we saw in Part II, Ashe can be defended as creating a worthy and workable incentive 
structure discouraging prosecutorial vexation and strategic bifurcation. No such vexation exists in the typical 
case where a prosecutor seeks reversal and retrial to correct an erroneous prodefendant ruling by the trial 
judge; appeal and retrial here would typically occur because the defendant?over the prosecutor's 
objection?persuaded the trial judge to commit legal error. If we generally allow retrial after an erroneous 
conviction (where the state is to blame for the initial error, and retrial can be vexing), we should allow 
retrial after an erroneous acquittal a fortiori. 
164. Note that I do not argue here that every American jurisdiction must or should provide for 
continuing jeopardy, but only that government should be free to do so if it chooses. Perhaps many 
legislatures will decide that in certain subcategories or across the board, the appeal and retrial game is not 
worth the candle. As with my work elsewhere, see supra note 48, here I address only questions of 
constitutional criminal procedure. 
165. While finding the logic of continuing jeopardy compelling, the Office of Legal Policy (OLP) 
rejected the idea on originalist grounds in 1987. See generally OLP REPORT, supra note 20. The main 
argument of the OLP was not textual but historical: England at the time of the Founding rejected continuing 
jeopardy (and so did many later American courts). 
This argument blurs the key difference between those legal rules that were effectively inscribed in 
constitutional text, and those that were not. The English cases, I submit, rested on the interaction of two 
distinct rules: (1) The double jeopardy principle barred a retrial after a true (that is, a suitably error-free 
and final) acquittal; and (2) domestic English law at the time did not provide for appeals of certain trial 
court error. Thus, trial court acquittals were suitably error-free and final in the sense that domestic English 
jurisdictional law chose to endow them with finality. But this second rule of English judicial structure was 
nowhere locked into the American Constitution; and if the American judicial structure were to depart from 
the English model, then the first principle?which was inserted into the text of the Double Jeopardy 
Clause?would interact differently. The Double Jeopardy Clause demands that if a true acquittal occurs, 
retrial is barred, but it looks to current domestic law, not the law of England in 1789, to determine what 
should count as a true acquittal. 
Analogously, we might ask whether double jeopardy today applies to RICO offenses. An OLP-like 
approach might lead us into the following absurdity: Since old England (and early America) did not view 
RICO as an offense, double jeopardy does not apply. The correct approach, of course, is to see two distinct 
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C. Jury Acquittals 
So far, we see that nothing in the Constitution, properly read, bars the state 
from structuring its domestic law to give appellate judges plenary power to 
correct the errors?to "reverse the calls"?of trial judges. We must now ask, 
what bars the state from likewise giving appellate judges plenary power to 
reverse the calls of juries? The short answer is the Sixth Amendment. In civil 
suits, the Seventh Amendment privileges jury factfinding, but a judge can 
reverse the call of a jury when it is clear beyond doubt that the jury has erred 
in its task.166 Under the Sixth Amendment, however, a criminal jury has the 
right to acquit a defendant even in the face of indisputable factual evidence of 
guilt.167 And so when the jury is given the proper evidence and the proper 
instructions, it may acquit and no other official can overrule its call: In legal 
contemplation, this properly informed jury's acquittal is by definition 
nonerroneous. Of course, its general power to acquit with finality does not 
mean it must be final on all its decisions (convictions and sentencing, for 
example); by analogy, the home-plate umpire is the ultimate arbiter of balls 
and strikes generally, but not on check swings. 
D. Mistrials and Misconduct 
Under the continuing jeopardy principle, an innocently induced 
mistrial?due, say, to juror illness?can indeed be followed by retrial: 
Jeopardy has begun, but has not yet ended, and may resume on a blank 
scorecard at retrial. (The issue is rather precisely analogous to a baseball game 
rules interacting 200 years ago: (1) The double jeopardy principle applied to all criminal offenses; and (2) 
domestic law at the time did not make RICO an offense. Only the first principle was inscribed into the 
Double Jeopardy Clause. The Clause demands that */ RICO is a criminal offense, retrial is barred; but it 
looks to current domestic law, not the law of England in 1789, to determine what should count as an 
offense. See supra text accompanying notes 51-62. 
To put the point one final way, recall that England does not generally allow a defendant to be retried 
after he successfully appeals his conviction. The current American rule, of course, ordinarily permits retrial 
after an appellate court reverses a conviction tainted by legal error. But, as we have seen, this retrial is 
permissible only because it simply continues the initial jeopardy, not because defendant somehow "waives" 
his double jeopardy rights. If retrial after erroneous conviction is allowed, so must be retrial after erroneous 
acquittal: The formal rules of the Double Jeopardy Clause are symmetric between acquittals and 
convictions. (Due process is, of course, asymmetric, and protects acquittals more; but there is no strong 
reason to specifically protect legally erroneous acquittals.) England, in short, cannot be our guide here 
because its domestic judicial structure sharply departs from America's, and nothing in the Double Jeopardy 
Clause freezes in place England's domestic jurisdictional rules for appeals. Cf. United States v. 
DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980) (allowing appellate court to increase sentence imposed by trial court 
where domestic law authorizes such appeals, and paying no heed to whether English appellate courts in 
1789 had such power as matter of domestic law). 
166. See Amar, supra note 31, at 685-86. 
167. Yet again, I echo Professor Westen. See Westen & Drubel, supra note 59, at 129-32 (deriving 
this right of criminal juries from series of doctrinal rules concerning directed verdicts, special verdicts, 
verdict inconsistency, and collateral estoppel); Westen, supra note 156, at 1012-23 (providing similar 
derivation). 
1997] Double Jeopardy Law Made Simple 1847 
called on account of rain after three innings.) In other contexts, where judges 
suspect that the prosecutor may have triggered a mistrial to avoid an 
impending defeat, the judges (whether at trial or on appeal) may simply 
declare the defendant the victor by penalty.168 But the key principles at work 
in determining when judges should award an acquittal by penalty are not the 
hard and fast rules of the Double Jeopardy Clause?which formally come into 
play only after an acquittal occurs?but the flexible, case-specific fair-play 
ideals of due process. These due process principles determine whether a judge 
should, in effect, direct an acquittal; and prosecutorial motive may matter here, 
in a way that it does not generally matter under the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
Formally, all that the Double Jeopardy Clause does is specify the consequences 
for future proceedings if the Due Process Clause or domestic law compels the 
judicial award of an acquittal by penalty.169 
If we view the misconduct/mistrial issue primarily through the prism ofthe 
Double Jeopardy Clause, we might think that the sole or most apt judicial 
response to prosecutorial misconduct is an award of acquittal; the Clause, as 
we have seen, is tightly linked to the idea of autrefois acquit. But once we see 
that a judicial award of acquittal is a kind of due process penalty for low 
blows, it becomes clear that this extreme sanction is only one of a whole set 
that could be devised.170 Ordinary games from everyday life offer a series 
of analogies. Some minor misconduct could be ignored.171 (Incidental contact 
under the boards, all part of the game.) Some more serious misconduct could 
be dealt with by sanctions outside the proceedings at hand, such as fines and 
contempt citations.172 (A three-game suspension.) Still other misconduct may 
call for disgorgement of ill-gotten gain in the proceeding at hand.173 (A 
touchdown called back because of offensive pass interference.) Some 
misconduct may trigger a defendant option?to continue a trial with a curative 
instruction, or to demand an immediate mistrial and new trial.174 (An option 
to decline the penalty, or to accept it and replay the down.) Other types of 
168. See Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 188 (1957); Westen & Drubel, supra note 59, at 
85-106. 
169. Alternatively, we could see acquittals by penalty as penumbral double jeopardy "principles" 
designed to prevent purposeful evasion of the core double jeopardy rule: A prosecutor who intentionally 
derails a case she is about to lose should stand in no better position than a prosecutor who in fact does lose 
(and is thus barred from retrial by the Double Jeopardy Clause's formal rule of autrefois acquit). 
The labeling issue here?are acquittals by penalty double jeopardy or due process issues??parallels 
the issues discussed supra Part II. 
170. Thus, my analysis of the Double Jeopardy Clause complements my analysis of other 
constitutional criminal procedure clauses. Elsewhere I have argued for alternative remedies to various kinds 
of exclusionary rules?under the Fourth Amendment, the Fifth Amendment Self-Incrimination Clause, and 
the Sixth Amendment Speedy Trial Clause?that needlessly free the guilty. See Amar, supra note 48. 
171. Cf. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18, 22 (1967) (propounding harmless error rule). 
172. This type of sanction is of course quite common today. 
173. In theory, this is what happens when a trial judge strikes from the record, and instructs the jury 
to ignore, counsel's improper question and any answer it elicited. 
174. See Westen & Drubel, supra note 59, at 102 nn.114 & 116, 104-05 (discussing this remedial 
possibility). 
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misbehavior may justify special opportunities for one's opponent.175 (A free 
penalty kick.) Still other forms of grave misconduct might be best addressed 
by allowing a defendant two shots at winning?either with the initial jury, or 
with a second jury summoned if the first jury convicts and the conviction is 
then set aside.176 (A "free play" in football that gives the quarterback two 
chances to score.) 
The broad range of possible alternative penalties suggests that judges 
should hesitate before awarding the extreme sanction of acquittal as a penalty. 
For such a sanction, of course, when cloaked with the special measure of 
finality of the Double Jeopardy Clause, can allow the guilty to escape without 
a full and fair trial of their guilt. If judges award an acquittal by penalty 
because the defendant was about to win his trial when the prosecution 
committed a low blow out of desperation, the award seems fully justified.177 
But to use such a sanction to punish or deter less egregious 
misconduct?especially where the defendant would likely have lost a fair first 
trial on the merits?is a very different thing. In many games, victory by 
penalty is not particularly troubling, since in the grand scheme of things it does 
not matter much who wins. But if the justice system is like a game in some 
ways,178 it is also much more than a game in other, more important 
ways.179 Lives and limbs?of victims as well as defendants?are serious 
business, and so it is hugely important in the criminal adjudication game to get 
it right: to acquit the innocent and convict the guilty. 
And, as I have tried to suggest throughout this Essay, constitutional 
interpretation is also serious business; here too it is important to try to play by 
the rules, and to get it right. In this Essay, I have tried to do both.180 
175. Cf. Rosemary Nidiry, Note, Restraining Adversarial Excess in Closing Argument, 96 COLUM. L. 
Rev. 1299, 1319-23 (1996) (discussing tit-for-tat "invited response" doctrine). 
176. In fact, this is apparently current doctrine's approach to certain types of mistrials. See Westen 
& Drubel, supra note 59, at 101-02, 106. Once we see this theoretical possibility, it is conceptually 
possible to argue that the most apt remedy in a particular case would be a requirement that the penalized 
party win three times in a row, or four, or more. 
Query whether this penalty could ever be imposed against a defendant for his low blows, or the low 
blows of his counsel. A judge could never award a victory by penalty to the government?such a ruling 
would be tantamount o a directed verdict and would violate the Sixth Amendment right of a jury to acquit 
against the evidence. But even accepting this asymmetry between the government and the defendant, must 
we also say that penalties less severe than victory by default can never be assessed against defendants who 
cheat in the adjudication game? 
177. See supra note 169. 
178. See Arthur Allen Leff, Law and, 87 Yale L.J. 989, 998-1005 (1978) (describing "Ludic 
Metaphor" and "The Game of the Trial" and concluding that if Leff's fictional 'Trial is not a game, it is 
not not a game either"). 
179. See Akhil Reed Amar, Hits, Runs, Trial Error: How Courts Let Legal Games Hide the Truth, 
Wash. Post, Apr. 16, 1995, at Cl ("A criminal trial is not a football game, even if it stars O.J. Simpson."). 
180. Playing by the rules of constitutional interpretation requires fidelity to constitutional text (among 
other things), but there are different ways that one can be faithful to a text. This Essay has featured three 
slightly different approaches. In Part I, fidelity to the poetic phrase "life or limb" called for literary 
sensitivity; in Part II, fidelity to the mathematical word "same" and the distinctly legal word "offense" 
called for a more legalistic and logic-chopping analytic framework; and in Part III, fidelity to the game 
metaphor at the root of the word "jeopardy" invited comparisons and contrasts with other familiar games. 
